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INTRODUCTION
Motorola: I want to review for you the things that we said on the
conference call.
Analyst: Okay.
Motorola: All right. Two weeks ago we said [in a press release]
that orders and sales in this segment were expected to be
significantly lower than the guidance at the beginning of the quarter.
Analyst: Hmm.
Motorola: Now when Motorola uses the word "significantly,"
maybe you're not familiar with this, but it's a longstanding approach
that we have, we are referring to a rate of change of 25% or more.
Analyst: Okay.
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Motorola: [Y]our model for that segment is showing two billion
eight-hundred-thirty million, that's only down twelve and one half
percent.
Analyst: Yes.
Motorola: Okay. So there's one place right away where your sales
assumption is more optimistic than we indicated it should be two
weeks ago.
Analyst: Thank you.
The above excerpt-taken from In the Matter of Motorola, Inc.2 -
is illustrative of how issuers sometimes "guided" analysts with their
economic models. Immediately after the private telephone call, the
stock analyst revised his earnings model in lieu of the new definition of
"significantly" he learned from Motorola's Investor Relations Director
("IRD").3  Specifically, the analyst "lowered his PCS revenue
expectation from $2.830 billion, a decline of 12.5% year-over-year, to
$2.330 billion, a decline of 28% year-over-year.' 4 This analyst was one
of approximately fifteen analysts directly contacted by Motorola's IRD
between March 6 and 12, 2001 . All of the analysts directly contacted
by the IRD revised their models following the calls.6 During the time
Motorola's IRD was contacting the analysts, Motorola's stock dropped
more than 15%, from $17.70 to $15.00.7  There was evidence of
significant trading volume at the firms where the analysts worked .
Those investors who were affiliated with the analysts to whom Motorola
conveyed the information were able to sell their stock before the price
1. In the Matter of Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46898 (2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-46898.htm (last visited Mar.








REGULATION FD-FAIRL Y DISRUPTIVE?
fell, thus protecting their investment.9 Meanwhile, the investing public
sat idly as their stock dropped and their fears rose. Public investors were
at a loss to explain the sudden drop in stock price without any public
news announcement by Motorola. Although the public knew that
Motorola's sales would be down "significantly," they did not know that
meant 25% or more. Motorola's use of code words to selectively
disclose information to analysts allowed them to trade with better
information which the investing public was not privy to. Instances such
as the one described above are not new to Wall Street and have allegedly
occurred several times in the past decades.'0
Many retail investors complained the investment playing field was
tilted unequally in favor of investment analysts and their clients because
companies selectively disclosed material information, many times
earnings forecasts (as was the case in Motorola), to analysts before the
news was released to the public." This practice allowed a select few to
trade ahead of the investing public. Although investors perceived the
practice of selective disclosure as unfair, it was not illegal under
Supreme Court precedent.' 2  The SEC sought to skirt precedent by
creating new issuer disclosure duties.
In October 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
promulgated Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Reg. FD"), requiring issuers
to disclose investment information to everyone or not at all. 3 The rule
prohibits public companies from selectively disclosing material,
9. S.E.C. Issues a Report of Investigation Concerning a Series of Selective
Disclosures of Material Nonpublic Information by Motorola, Inc., S.E.C. NEWS DIG.,
Nov. 25, 2002, at 8 (stating that during the period of the IRD's telephone calls, there
were significant increases in the trading volume of Motorola stock at most of the firms
where analysts were contacted).
10. See ARTHUR LEvrr, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND
CoRpoRATE AMERICA DON'T WANT You TO KNOW-WHAT You CAN Do TO FIGHT
BACK 89 (Pantheon Publishing 2002) (citing examples of leaps in companies' share
prices in the 1990's as a result of information disclosed to analysts).
11. See generally id. at 90 (stating that when analysts received inside information,
their brokerage firms would trade on that information).
12. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (holding that in the absence of any
personal benefit, no tipper liability extends to the insider who selectively disclosed
material nonpublic information or the analyst who recommended trading in the
company's stock to clients).
13. General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2003)
[hereinafter General Rule].
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nonpublic information to a select few, such as investment analysts, prior
to releasing it to the public.1 4 For example, if Motorola wanted to
explain to analysts that "significantly lower" meant "25% or more,"
Motorola should have disclosed this information simultaneously to the
public when Motorola called the analysts. The regulation was adopted
to address what the SEC perceived to be the problem of public
companies selectively disclosing information to Wall Street
professionals at the expense of Main Street lay investors. 5 On
November 25, 2002 the SEC issued a Report of Investigation Pursuant
to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which
concluded that Motorola communicated material nonpublic information
to selected analysts when it quantified earnings information that had
been previously disclosed only in vague qualitative terms. 6
Early critics of Reg. FD argued the regulation could have the
adverse effect of restricting the quantity and quality of information
companies disclose because of fears of noncompliance. 17 They further
argued that the chilling effect on disclosure would affect Main Street
because less disclosure meant fewer informed investment decisions." In
addition, they maintained that if Reg. FD limits selective disclosure, it
does so at a great cost because investors will be less informed about a
company's performance and will not lead to fairer, more efficient
markets that Reg. FD proponents advocated.' 9 Market analysts perform
an invaluable role in capital markets: they collect information, analyze
and process it, and report it in a form easily digestible by the investing
public.20 If analysts no longer receive information from the companies
they cover, analysts' reports become less accurate and the public who
purchases these reports suffer.2' Unfortunately, the rule leaves open
many unresolved issues that need to be answered.22
14. Id.
15. See LEvrrr, supra note 10, at 88-90.
16. See Motorola, supra note 1.
17. See LEvITT, supra note 10, at 94.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 69.
21. Id.
22. Marc I. Steinberg & Jason B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden
Issues of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation FD, 27 J. CoRP. L. 173,
178 (2002).
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This article addresses the negative consequences of Reg. FD with
specific attention to the effect on efficiency and volatility of the capital
markets. Not only do I discuss the validity of Reg. FD's critics'
concerns, but I examine another issue they do not consider: efficiency.
Although Reg. FD was passed to enhance the flow of market
information, it did so at the expense of market efficiency. I argue that
although the SEC's ban on selective disclosure might make the markets
appear more fair, it is not because investors who purchase investments
buy them at a discount which reflects the risks of selective disclosure. If
the stockholders lose money as a result of selective disclosure, they do
so knowing this potential risk and thus lose their bet.
Part I discusses the proposed regulation, former SEC Commissioner
Arthur Levitt's reasons for enacting the rule, and the various
stakeholders' responses to the regulation. In addition, this part reviews
the revisions as a result of industry concerns that led to the drafting of
the final rule. Last, this part will discuss Reg. FD's operation. Part II
examines recent enforcement actions brought by the SEC and an
analysis of what may be learned from these actions. Part III questions
the validity of Reg. FD supporters' and opponents' concerns in light of
recent empirical research regarding the "chilling" of information, stock
volatility, earnings forecast accuracy, and others. Part IV introduces the
efficient capital market theory, its importance to the economy,
investment market, and securities regulation, and its criticisms. Part V
analyzes how Reg. FD diminishes the analyst's role in the investment
market to the detriment of efficient markets and how, if selective
disclosure and trading were allowed, it would contribute to more
efficient markets. Additionally, I highlight other advantages for
allowing selective disclosures and trading on such information. Last, I
challenge Reg. FD supporters who advocate selective disclosure is not
fair. This article then concludes with a brief analysis of how efficiency
should prevail over fairness and how the SEC, in its attempt to cure a
perceived harm, instead brought injury to the capital markets and the
people whom it sought to protect.
2004]
642 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
I. REGULATION FD
A. Chairman Arthur Levitt: Selective Disclosure Is Wrong, Plain and
Simple2 3
Chairman Levitt believed that selective disclosure had gotten out of
hand in the 1990's and put small investors at a serious disadvantage to
analysts and other market players who received information on
corporate earnings ahead of the public.24 Levitt believed that practice
was wrong, plain and simple. 25 The former chairman believed Reg. FD
was an audacious move and noted it was overwhelmingly opposed by
the securities industry.26 Even some of Levitt's colleagues at the SEC
had misgivings about FD. 7 Levitt had to continuously and actively
oppose a "lobbying blitz" by Reg. FD opponents, which even consisted
of meeting then Senate Banking Committee Chairman Phil Gramm.
2
Levitt convinced Gramm that Reg. FD would make the markets more
efficient by making sure that everyone had the opportunity to get the
same information at the same time. Gramm agreed to not to interfere
with Reg. FD.2 9
Levitt stated that he had firsthand experience as a former broker and
investment banker with companies that sometimes leaked news to
analysts.30 He recalled one chief executive who used the analyst at
Levitt's firm to leak earnings-per-share information in the hope that the
analyst would write a favorable report and push the stock through the
firm's brokers. 3' Levitt noted that for the next two decades companies
increasingly leaked earnings information to analysts.32 He stated
companies did this to avoid missing analysts' consensus forecast.33
23. See LEVITT, supra note 10, at 87.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 93.
27. Id. at 88.
28. Id. at 93.
29. Id.
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Chairman Levitt recognized that current law did not expressly
prohibit selective disclosure. Levitt recruited the help of a prominent
securities professor from Columbia University School of Law, Harvey
Goldschmid, to help formulate an SEC rule to combat selective
disclosure. 4 Instead of focusing on insider trading, Goldschmid turned
to the part of the securities laws that allowed the SEC to regulate
communications between public companies and the market.35 Levitt and
Goldschmid's end product became Regulation Fair Disclosure.
B. The Proposed Legislation
Reg. FD was first proposed by the SEC in December 1999.36 The
SEC proposal was made pursuant to its statutory authority under Section
13(a) 37 and Section 15(d)38 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") to mandate continuing disclosure of issuers who were
registered under Section 12 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.39  The
proposal required that whenever: (1) an Exchange Act-registered issuer,
or any person who acting on its behalf, (2) discloses material nonpublic
information (3) to any person outside the issuer (other than a person who
held a duty of trust or confidence not to disclose such information), (4)
the issuer must (a) simultaneously (for intentional disclosures), or (b)
promptly (for non-intentional disclosures) (5) disclose the information to
the public.4° In proposing Reg. FD, the SEC stated three policy
concerns: (a) to maintain investor confidence in the fairness and
34. Id. at91.
35. Id. at 92.
36. Bill Bamhart, Fair Disclosure Rule Dilutes Analyst Advantage, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 20, 2000, at C3.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2004) (granting the SEC the power to require that issuers
file such information and documents required to keep current the information and
documents required to be filed with application or registration statement and any annual
or quarterly reports as well as duplicative copies of all).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2004) (granting the SEC the power to require that issuers
submit supplementary information).
39. See Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §
243), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-42259.htm (last visited Mar.
24, 2004) [hereinafter Selective Disclosure].
40. See id.
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integrity of the securities markets,4 ' (b) to minimize conflicts of interests
among analysts and the issuers which might seek to curry favor with
analysts in return for favorable coverage,42 and (c) to update the
securities laws to reflect "revolutions in communications and
information technologies [which] have made it much easier for issuers
today to disseminate important information broadly and swiffly. '43 In
the Proposed Rule, the SEC recognized Congress' intent "to promote
disclosure of honest, complete, and correct information to facilitate the
operation of fair and efficient markets." 44 Congress' goal of "[f]ull and
fair disclosure of information by issuers of securities to the investing
public is a cornerstone of the federal securities laws. '45 The SEC cited a
number of additional justifications for the Proposed Rule. First,
corporate management may be tempted to treat inside information as a
commodity to be used to garner favor with particular analysts.46 The
rule relieves any pressure for an analyst to report favorably about the
company. By requiring issuers to publicly disclose private information
disclosed to analysts, this requirement helps eliminate the possibility that
companies will delay corporate disclosure thereby allowing management
discretion in "selectively disclos[ing] the information to curry favor or
bolster credibility with particular analysts or institutional investors.
'47
Second, full disclosure encourages analysts to become more diligent in
finding corporate information, whereas selective disclosure encourages
analysts to revise their earnings estimates based primarily on corporate
insiders guidance, instead of analysts' independent research.48  Many
commentators have feared that analysts reports are biased optimistically
for those companies who selectively disclose inside information to
analysts, thus threatening analysts' independence.49 Companies have








48. Id. ("[I)f selective disclosure were to go unchecked, opportunities for analyst
conflicts of interests would flourish.").
49. Id.
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information if they issue unfavorable reports on companies' stock. 0
Last, recent technology has enabled rapid disclosure of information to
the investing public." This technology has arguably replaced the need
for information intermediaries such as analysts.5 2
The proposed Reg. FD did not require immediate public disclosure
of all material developments of a company as they occurred. 3 Instead,
the proposal required issuers who disclosed material nonpublic
information to do so "broadly to the investing public, not selectively to a
favored few.",5 4 Further, the proposal did not define the term "material"
and merely cited the all too familiar definition established in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. which stated that information is
considered material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important" in making an investment
decision, or if it would have "significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available. 55
C. Response to the Proposed Re. FD
1. The Investing Public
The proposal sparked much controversy within the financial
industry 6 but received a warm reception from individual, retail
50. Amitabh Dugar & Siva Nathan, Analysts'Research Reports: Caveat Emptor, 5
J. INVESTING 1, 13 (1996) (citing examples of companies refusing to respond to analysts
requests for information).
51. See Selective Disclosure, supra note 39.
52. Id. (listing available technologies for reaching the public).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting TSC Industries, Inc., v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
56. See, e.g., Letter from Arthur Zeikel, Chairman, and Thomas A. Bowman, Chief
Financial Officer, President, and Chief Executive Officer, The Association for
Investment Management and Research, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (April 26, 2000), available at
http://www.aimr.org/advocacy/00commltr/00disclosure.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2004) [hereinafter Arthur Zeikel Letter].
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investors. 7 Many securities market professionals and lawyers opposed
the rule for many reasons including liability concerns, a "chilling effect"
on information distribution, and volatility.58 These concerns will be
addressed throughout this Article.
The SEC received nearly six thousand public comments after
proposing Reg. FD.5 9 The vast majority of these comments were from
lay investors who expressed their violent opposition to selective
disclosure.6° For example, one investor proclaimed, "Stop selective
disclosure now! It is really selective collusion to defraud the small
investor.6' Another remarked, "I was shocked and appaled [sic] to learn
that our country, 'the land of the free' still allows the major brokerage
houses on wallstreet [sic] access to information which is withheld from
the rest of the country for several days."62 And another exclaimed, "I
am an individual investor, and to be frank, I am amazed that such
selective disclosures were not already illegal. Why should some
analysts have access to information that I can not? Are they somehow
better than I am, more privileged than I? I think not!",
63
Other lay investors agreed with the SEC's justifications of Reg. FD.
Some commentators noted that the technology available today allows
everyone to hear financial information at the same time.64  One
commentator shared, "In this day and age of computers and lightning
information, the playiing [sic] fields needs to be even for everyone.1 65
These commentators expressed that the "online revolution has created a
greater demand, expectation, and need for delivery of market
57. See generally Comments on Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199.shtml (last visited Mar.
24, 2004).
58. See, e.g., Arthur Zeikel Letter, supra note 56.
59. See Selective Disclosure, supra note 39.
60. See id.
61. Letter from Brian Juntenumen, to SEC Commissioners (April 26, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0426b02w.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
62. Letter from Brian Krasney, to SEC Commissioners (April 25, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0425b 11.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
63. Letter from Michael W. Glackon, to SEC Commissioners (April 25, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0425b09.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
64. Letter from David I. Eiland, to SEC Commissioners (April 26, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0426b02.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
65. Letter from Ms. Cline, to SEC Commissioners (April 26, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0420b0lw.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
REGULATION FD-FAIRL YDISR UPTIVE?
information. 66  Other commentators have shown disdain towards
analysts who cannot do their jobs without the help of inside information.
In particular, one commentator remarked, "If Wall Street analysts cannot
do their job without private information supplied to them, then what
function do they serve?"' 67 Some commentators believed that analysts
who hold inside information commit insider trading for the benefit of
themselves or their clients. 6' However, other commentators still value
the need for analysts by using their experience and education to provide
value to lay investors. As one commentator observed, "Wall St. analysts
do not in any way qualify for special treatment in the disclosure of
information. However, the added value of the Wall St. community
should be in the breadth of their research and opinion (i.e., expectations
of a company within an industry, or an industry within an economy,
etc.)." 69 Still other commentators have exclaimed their willingness to
bypass analysts' help, and invest on the commentators' own research.
One frenzied investor proclaimed, "I am a private investor with no tie to
the financial community, and I find it appalling and arrogant that the
purported experts in the field of investing feel that we cannot understand
and filter raw corporate data on our own without their expert analysis. 70
These commentators often voiced the theme that the security analyst's
work would be more objective and accurate if selective disclosure were
prohibited.7' In sum, investors stated the practice of selective disclosure
was unfair and many likened it to a form of insider trading. Even some
security market participants recognized the problems associated with
selective disclosure and supported the SEC's proposed rule.73
66. See Selective Disclosure, supra note 39.
67. Letter from David. A. Giglio, to SEC Commissioners (April 26, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0426b02.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
68. Letter from Stephen De Shazo, to SEC Commissioners (April 26, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0420b01w.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
69. Letter from Dennis Heath, to SEC Commissioners (April 26, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0426bO2.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
70. Letter from Bob Kendall, to SEC Commissioners (April 26, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/0426b02.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
71. See generally supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 60-62, 66-67 and accompanying text.
73. See generally supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
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2. The Securities Industry
a. The Association for Investment Management and Research
Numerous security industry participants commented on the SEC's
Proposed Rule. Perhaps one of the largest opponents to the Proposed
Rule was the Association for Investment Management and Research
(AIMR). AIMR is a nonprofit organization with over 50,000 investment
practitioners and educators worldwide. 74 AIMR's stated mission is "[t]o
lead the investment profession globally by setting the highest standards
of education, integrity, and professional excellence., 75  AIMR's
members include portfolio managers, securities analysts, consultants and
strategists who often carry the prestigious certified financial analyst
(CFA) designation.76
In April 26, 2000 AIMR sent a lengthy comment letter to the SEC
explaining its position on Reg. FD. AIMR acknowledged that it
supported increased dissemination of information, but recognized that
Reg. ED would not achieve that goal because of the negative impact
Reg. FD would have on investment professionals.77 AIMR stated that
the public's view that investment analysts frequently receive inside
material information from companies is false, and that this perception
stemmed from the public's "misunderstanding of the role of investment
professionals. 'T In addition, contrary to the SEC's view that the rule
would increase company information to the public, AIMR believed the
rule would decrease both the quality and quantity of information because
issuers would constantly be on their guard with respect to what they say
and to whom they speak. 79 If companies are asked hard questions,
AIMR quips, companies would hide behind the rule to avoid answering,
or would simply relay "boilerplate language" or "sound bites."' °
74. See Association for Investment Management and Research's website, at
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AIMR believed that the SEC would better understand AIMR's
position if it explained the role of analysts in the capital markets and
how they evaluate and interpret information and repackage into a
"mosaic" that is used by investors to make their investment decisions."'
Analysts gather data from a large variety of resources such as regulatory
filings, 10-Ks and 10-Qs, the media, and people.82 Analysts use their
skill, intuition, and perception to "ferret out" seemingly innocuous bits
of information to a lay investor, that, when amalgamated with other
nuggets of information, are highly informative to the investment
decision-making process.8 3 Analysts, because of their experience, may
"see" the big picture before others and are better able to recognize when
public corporate information "rings false" to the information analysts
have gleaned from other sources.84 Analysts are proactive and often
bypass company contacts to seek information from contractors,
suppliers, customers, and even competitors to garner pieces of a puzzle
from which to build their "mosaic."85 The AIMR recognized that while
lay investors could complete their own mosaic, analysts, because of their
education and experience, probably are more effective.86
Even though analysts receive corporate information from many
avenues, AIMR is concerned that Reg. FD would greatly discourage
one-on-one communications with issuers preventing disclosure of not
material information but information "to fully understand the company's
background and culture, to gain perspective about trends and
developments."87 In addition, certain valuable information disclosed.by
companies such as business strategy is often complicated and takes
"research, consideration, interpretation, and dialogue" that can only be
elicited in one-on-one communications.8 AIMR believed this dialogue
to be crucial for the critical dissemination of information to the public.89
AIMR also believed that Reg. FD would significantly alter the flow











650 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
determining what is material to the issuer.90 AIMR argued that issuers
would be forced to consider more thoroughly and precisely what
information is likely to be deemed material to an investor which would
inevitably make issuers more reticent to disclose anything because they
do not know what will be "material" to investors.9' AIMR agreed with
the SEC that issuers would need to make "instant materiality judgments"
when fielding questions from analysts.92 AIMR also agreed with the
SEC that since issuers would more than likely need to consult with their
attorneys more frequently before responding to questions, Reg. FD
cannot help but to curtail the issuer's willingness to answer any
questions whatsoever. 93  To avoid inadvertent disclosure of material
information, AIMR argued that issuers would not hold private meetings
any longer.94  In addition, AIMR predicted that increased use of
attorneys in corporate communications would lead to increased use of
"boilerplate" language and thus, reduce the amount of relevant
information in disclosure documents. 95  Further, corporate counsel
would more than likely sanitize communications to avoid any question
about a statement's materiality.96 AIMR believed that one way to reduce
the need for attorneys is for the SEC to give clearer guidance on the
definition of materiality. 97  Unless the SEC does so, ALMR argued,
issuers would continue to speak "at risk., 98 In essence, if Reg. FD is







96. Id. "Counsel would most likely advise the use of formal, structured and
abbreviated disclosure in order to avoid any questions about the information's
materiality." Id. "Issuers will continue to speak, but no meaningful information will be
communicated." Id. "We believe that such sanitized communications would continue
until uncertainty about how the regulation will be enforced is diminished." Id.
97. Id. "The AIMR Task Force believes that one way to reduce the involvement of
legal counsel is to develop a 'bright line' definition of materiality." Id. "At a minimum,
this definition could include clear standards about what kind of information, such as
earnings forecasts, would always be considered material." Id.
98. Id. "Without such standards, whenever issuers speak in other than a public
forum, they will always be "at risk" regardless of their ex ante materiality assessments."
Id.
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the spot" materiality determinations that the SEC may deem material
after the fact.99
b. The Securities Industry Association
Another large opponent to the Proposed Rule was The Securities
Industry Association ("SIA"). SIA was formed in 1972 and has over
600 securities firms in its membership. °  These firms include
investment banks, broker-dealers, and mutual fund companies that
participate world-wide in corporate and public finance.' 0' SIA
"employ[s] more than 800,000 individuals, representing 97 percent of
total employment in securities brokers and dealers.' 0 2
In another lengthy letter to the SEC, SIA on April 6, 2000 voiced
strong opposition to Reg. FD because to its judgment, Reg. FD would
discourage companies from divulging important information. 3  SIA
found it strange where, despite the current trend showing that issuers
were opening conference calls to the public,' °4 the SEC would
promulgate a rule that SIA finds would stymie the disclosure of
corporate information. 10 5 According to SIA, in order for issuers to avoid
the problems of Reg. FD, they would eliminate meetings with analysts,
become "more circumspect in what they say at open meetings," and
99. Letter from Michael S. Caccese, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
The Association for Investment Management and Research, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 8, 2000), at
http://www.aimr.org/advocacy/00commltr/00regfd.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
100. See Securities Industry Association's website, at http://www.sia.com/aboutsia/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
101. Id.
102. See Securities Industry Association's Annual Report, available at
http://www.sia.com/ar2003/mission.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
103. Letter from Lee B. Spencer, Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Proposed
Regulation FD, and George A. Schieren, Vice-President, Legal SIA Compliance and
Legal Division, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission 4
(April 6, 2000), at http://www.aimr.org/advocacy/sia.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2004)
(stating that "we find it very puzzling and troubling that the commission is considering
a step that we believer will operate to constrict the flow of information.")
104. Id. at 3-4 (noting a recent survey by the National Investor Relations Institute
that found 82% of issuers who conducted conference calls allowed real-time access to
the public-up from 29% and 14% two years previous).
105. See id. at 4.
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prohibit telephone conversations with analysts. 0 6 These steps would
result in less information for the investing public. 0 7 SIA also stated that
issuers who were previously reluctant to disclose information would
hide behind the rule as an excuse not to talk.10 8  In addition to the
numerous problems enumerated by AIMR's comment letter, SIA found
other reasons why Reg. FD may not be good policy.
SIA believed the term "selective disclosure" was unnecessarily
broad because it included not only disclosure to analysts for an improper
"quid pro quo" but also included ordinary channels of communication
with benign motives.'0 9 SIA believed these communications help get
information to the marketplace and are in the public's interest."0 In
addition, SIA stated that historically, the securities regulations mandated
only certain disclosure; however, the Commission is now re-writing
history by requiring a "springing obligation" to disclose a material fact
just because this fact was disclosed to an outsider."' SIA noted that
under the securities laws all investors are entitled to equal access to
information for mandatory disclosure and any information issuers
voluntarily disclose to the public." 2 However, SIA was quick to note
that the securities laws do not contemplate equal access to all material
corporate information." 3  In addition, SIA cited Supreme Court
precedent disclaiming any right to equal information absent
Congressional intent." 4 SIA further argued that even assuming issuer




109. Id. at 5.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 7.
112. See id. at 7-8 (stating that "[t]he Securities Act and the Exchange Act
contemplate a parity of access to required information and beyond that, the information
the issuer chooses to include in registration statements and reports or otherwise makes
public.").
113. See id. at 8.
114. See id. at 8-9. (noting that "[i]n 1980 and 1983 the Supreme Court expressly
denied the Commission's authority to impose an equal information rule under Securities
Act § 17 and Exchange Act § 10(b). In fact, while we cannot say whether the Court
contemplated Commission action under Exchange Act §§ 13 and 15(d), it said in
Chiarella and repeated in Dirks that formulation of an absolute equal information rule
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of Congressional intent.").
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another and be able to act on it quicker."' SIA proposed an example
where investors who watched the first television screen on which
information appeared would have a distinct advantage over one who
received the information via a news alert signal.1 6 Further, the recipient
of inadvertent material information would have an advantage over the
world until the issuer makes a public statement." 7  In sum, SIA
concluded parity of access to material information was "illusory."" 8
SIA also argued that the phrase "persons acting on behalf of an
issuer" was defined unnecessarily broadly to possibly include a
purchasing agent who talks to suppliers about materials necessary for a
unique product or even a salesman who talks to potential buyers about a
fascinating new product coming to market." 9 SIA declared that the
purchasing agent or salesman would have to get a confidentiality
agreement from the supplier or buyers or else the company is bound to
disclose this information to the marketplace. 2 ° SIA supposed that as a
practical matter, it would be extremely difficult for management to
constantly monitor their employees' communications with outsiders.1
2 1
Further complicating the process, SIA posed the question how a "senior
official" is to determine whether an employee's comment was made
intentionally or unintentionally? 22 What if the manager did not think
the comment was material and because of his busy schedule did not tell
the issuer until later? 2 3 When does the issuer's duty to disclose this
information commence? 24 What if the recipient of information breaks
the confidentiality agreement? 125 Does the issuer still have to disclose
publicly this information? 26 When? 27 SIA concluded there existed a
host of practical issues that cannot easily and definitely be resolved.12 1
115. See id. at 9.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 10.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 18.
120. See id. at 19.
121. See id. at 19.
122. Id. at 19-20.





128. Id. at 21.
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And thus, issuers would avoid this conundrum altogether by shutting
their mouths and "restricting the flow of information."
'' 29
SIA also voiced its concerns about increased litigation risk.'
30
Although SIA noted that Reg. FD expressly prohibited section 10(b) of
the 1934 Exchange Act actions for Reg. FD violations, SIA believed that
when an issuer makes a public disclosure it, in essence, admits that the
statement is material. 3' SIA was concerned that the clever securities
plaintiff's bar could make something out of this. 32 Although the SEC
would take action for only egregious conduct, SIA asserted that
reasonable persons could differ on the question of materiality and
egregious conduct. 3
SIA concluded the costs of Reg. FD's compliance would greatly
outweigh any possible benefits. 34 SIA cited the SEC's estimate that
issuers would make about five public disclosures under Reg. FD per
year. 35 SIA, however, proclaimed that the SEC had no factual basis for
making this conservative estimate, and SIA predicted disclosures would
be "in far excess of that amount. ' 136 SIA also argued that the costs of
disclosure would be more burdensome for small issuers as opposed to
large issuers because "materiality is to a large extent a function of
size."'137 Most importantly, SIA pointed out the SEC failed to consider
the enormous issue outside of costs to the issuer-the costs to the
marketplace-in terms of increased volatility, surprise, and accuracy of
stock pricing if Reg. FD does in fact limit the flow of information into
the marketplace. 38 To summarize, SIA conceded that it could not
quantify the costs of compliance like the SEC could not quantify the
benefits of Reg. FD.' 39 Therefore, SIA argued that the SEC should not
engage in rule-making where "the benefits and costs of which are so
129. Id.








138. See id. at 31.
139. See id.
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Steve Luczo, CEO of Seagate Technologies and former investment
banker, believed that Reg. FD impeded the flow of quality information
to the market place.14 1 Luczo states that, "FD, in many ways, has
restricted what companies can say and how they respond. What short-
sellers can do is say whatever they want, and drive the stock down a
point or two. In the face of no buyers, it's a really good business.' 42
Luczo spotted a factual mistake in one analyst's report and asked the
analyst why he did not obtain verification from Seagate. 143 The analyst
responded that "his firm's compliance department warned [that] he
could not talk to the company."' 44 Luczo noted that the analyst may just
be using Reg. FD as an excuse for his own ineptness, but Luczo believed
that Reg. FD had "produced a climate of fear."'
45
Other public companies are not influenced by Reg. FD to increase
communications with the public. Chewing gum maker Wm. Wrigley Jr.
Co. does not hold conference calls or plan to Webcast.' 46  "There
wouldn't be any change in the policy right now," stated Wrigley's
Corporate Communications Director Christopher J. Perille. 47  In
addition, Winn Dixie Stores spokesman G. E. "Mickey" Clerc stated, "If
we felt we had something we needed to talk about, then we would.
There's no set schedule.' 4' Bina Thompson, Vice President of Investor
Relations at Colgate-Palmolive, told SEC Commissioners at the April
2001 roundtable that Reg. FD is hampering efforts to correct wayward
140. See id.
141. Scott Herhold, Seagate CEO Takes Aim at Fair-Disclosure Rule, MERCURY
NEWS, Mar. 03, 2003, available at





146. See Joseph Weber, Full Disclosure for All: The Web Allows Corporations to
Share Information Quickly and Cheaply, Bus. WK., Sept. 18, 2000, available at
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earnings estimates. 149 She also stated that companies are "fearful that
individual contact with an analyst risks violation of the rule."' 5° While
Colgate-Palmolive does meet with analysts, it believes its public releases
alone satisfy the public and SEC requirements.' United Airlines
("United") claimed that before Reg. FD, United "gave out more
information than other airlines."' 152 However, United has used the rule as
an excuse to not disclose any information the Regulation does not
require.'53
Some public companies, such as AOL Time-Warner, believe
otherwise. AOL's Investor Relations Vice-President Richard E. Hanlon
believes some analysts are using Reg. FD "as an excuse to get
grumpy." 4 He expressed, "[w]e're always better off when more people
have a better and fuller understanding of what we're about."'"
4. Other Commentators
Many commentators reiterated the "chilling effect" on corporate
disclosures that both the AIMR and SIA announced. Because
materiality judgments are difficult and risky to make, management is
potentially less likely to discuss important information at all. 56 These
types of situations highlight the dangers of creating a "chilling effect" on
releasing corporate information because of management's reluctance to
disclose anything at all for fear of making erroneous materiality
judgments and being subject to liability. 57  Sullivan & Cromwell, a
prestigious global law firm based in New York City, commented to the
149. See Jeff D. Opdyke & Michael Schroeder, Disclosure Rule Gets a Bad Rap,
WALL ST. J., June 5, 2001, at Cl.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Robert McGough & Cassell Bryan-Law, Analysts' Earnings Estimates Are
Diverging, and SEC Disclosure Rule May Be the Reason, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2000, at
C2.
153. See id.
154. See Weber, supra note 146.
155. Id.
156. See Lubna Kably, Selective Disclosure, THE ECON. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 23648667.
157. See Norm Alster, Tight Lips Sink Stock Tips; Has Regulation FD Had a
Chilling Effect on the Flow of Information from Public Companies?, ELECTRONIC Bus.,
July 1, 2001 at 56.
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SEC that because corporate officials must make instant materiality
judgments they would preclude in-depth questioning by analysts at
conference calls.'58  This firm feared that this practice "would
discourage enterprising analysts from digging as deeply into corporate
affairs as they are permitted to do under current standards and
practices."' 59 The firm decried Reg. FD would prevent talented analysts
from differentiating themselves from others.' 60 Additionally, issuers
would adhere to a script vetted by its counsel to avoid disclosing
material information.' 6' The increasing formalization would lead to a
significant negative effect on the scope and quality of disclosures
because of a lack of "give-and-take discussion and communication of
nuances" that are not readily available in public documents.
61
Other commentators questioned the need for such a rule. 63 They
argued the SEC's justifications for the rule consisted of very little
evidence of selective disclosure."6  In addition, the SEC cited no
empirical study of issuer disclosure practices. 65  In fact, the current
trend was that issuers were opening up their conference calls to
investors.' 66 A survey by the National Investor Relations Institute found
that sixty one percent of survey participants were broadcasting their
conference calls over the Internet for access by individual investors.1
67
158. See Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission (Apr. 04, 2000), at





163. See, e.g., Letter from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, to Jonathan Katz,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 28, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/clearyl.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
See also John F.X. Peloso & Ben A. Indek, Recent SEC Rule Proposals Come Under
Attack, N.Y.L.J., June 15, 2000, at 3 (suggesting it is a hastily drafted response to a few
widely publicized cases where analysts allegedly misused inside information).
164. Id.; see also Arthur Zeikel Letter, supra note 56.
165. See Letter from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, supra note 163.
166. NIRI Survey Finds Adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure Likely to Limit
Amount of Information Disclosed to Market Participants (Aug. 2000), at
http://www.niri.orglpublications/alerts/EA08080O.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
167. Id.
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One commentator raised constitutional concerns declaring that Reg.
FD would "compel speech" contrary to Supreme Court precedent.
68
Other critics argued that the new regulation would lead to "information
overload" where issuers may decide to err on the side of caution by
disclosing both material and nonmaterial information. 69 If analysts no
longer "ferret out" important information, lay investors may be burdened
by too much information and might not be able to properly analyze the
information and make appropriate trading decisions.170  Other
commentators argued that Wall Street information would be "dumbed
down" for lay investors. 17' Fidelity Investments has vociferated that
Reg. FD "drags smart mutual-fund analysts down to the level of the
masses because they can no longer ask in private the thoughtful




The SEC took the opponents' criticism into account which led the
SEC to revise the Proposed Rule by narrowing its scope, but kept its
main provisions intact.173 Despite the enormous controversy, the SEC
adopted its Final Rule on August 10, 2000 and became effective on
October 23, 2000.174
168. Letter from Joseph McLaughlin, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (June 30, 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/mclaugh1.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
169. See Laura S. Unger, Rethinking Disclosure in the Information Age: Can There
Be Too Much of a Good Thing?, Address before the Intemet Securities Regulation
American Conference Institute (June 26, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter
Unger, Rethinking Disclosure].
170. See Michael P. Daly & Robert A. Del Giomo, Note, The SEC's New
Regulation FD: A Critical Analysis, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 457, 483 (2002).
171. See Marissa P. Vicarro, Comment, Can Regulation Fair Disclosure Survive the
Aftermath of Enron?, 40 DUQ. L. REv. 695, 700 (2002) (noting various commentators
who state financial information has become less informative).
172. Id. (citing Opdyke & Schroeder, supra note 149).
173. See General Rule, supra note 13.
174. Id.
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2. Enter Commissioner Laura Unger
The SEC rule was not a unanimous decision: the SEC passed
Regulation FD three to one, with then Commissioner Laura Unger
strenuously dissenting. 75 Unger, a Republican, reiterated the "chilling
effect" the rule would have on corporate disclosure of information into
the marketplace. 76 According to Unger, while the SEC has "bet the
store" that Regulation FD would work, she has "bet her house"' 77 that it
would not. 7 1 She further stated that "Regulation FD turns on its head
the longstanding relationship between issuers and analysts.' 79  The
Commissioner believed that Reg. FD was a communication rule that was
formed to cure a trading problem-trading based on selective
disclosure. 80 She believed that "in its attempt to eradicate actual trading
by clients of analysts following a selective disclosure, Reg. FD burdened
the vast majority of issuers, who are good corporate citizens, with new
disclosure requirements."'' In addition, Commissioner Unger was
concerned about the quality and quantity of information that would be
disseminated after the rule's effectiveness.1
8 2
Commissioner Unger vowed to vigorously monitor Reg. FD's
effect on information flow. 3 Without the changes to Reg. FD, Unger
may have had support from Commissioner Hunt. In a speech before the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries on June 30, 2000, Hunt
175. See LEVrr, supra note 10, at 88.
176. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Address at the Glasser LegalWorks
Conference on SEC Regulation FD (Oct. 27, 2000), at




180. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger Regulation Fair Disclosure: Hearing
Before the House Sub-Committee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government
Sponsored Enterprises, 107th Congress (May 17, 2001), (statement of Laura Unger,
Commissioner of Securities Exchange Commission), at
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stated that Reg. FD as proposed "would be extremely costly to
corporations and provide little benefit to investors."'
84
3. Revisions to Narrow Scope of Regulation FD
To quell commentators' fear about the likelihood of any chilling
effect on corporate disclosure or inappropriate liability, the Commission
modified Regulation FD in several ways. 8 5 First, the Commission
narrowed the rule to not include communications to all persons outside
of the issuer. 86 Instead, the rule disallows communications only to
securities markets professionals and anyone "[w]ho is a holder of the
issuer's securities under circumstances in which it is reasonably
foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the issuer's securities on
the basis of the information."'
8 7
Second, the Commission addressed issuers' concern about ordinary
business communication. 88 Reg. FD only applies to issuer personnel
such as "any senior official of the issuer... or any other officer,
employee, or agent of an issuer who regularly communicates with any
person described in sections 243.100(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), or with holders
of the issuer's securities.!'
Third, the Commission removed any doubt about private liability
by including an express provision in the text stating that "[n]o failure to
make a public disclosure required solely by section 243.100 shall be
deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange
Act." 190
Fourth, the SEC provided additional assurance that issuers will not
be second-guessed on close materiality calls. 9' The Commission stated
that liability arises only when the issuer "knows, or is reckless in not
184. SEC Commissioner Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., Remarks at the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries (June 30, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch388.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
185. Compare General Rule, supra note 13, with Selective Disclosure, supra note
39.
186. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) (2004).
187. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv) (2004).
188. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2004).
189. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2004).
190. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2004).
191. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (2004).
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knowing, that the information he or she is communicating is both
material and nonpublic.' 92  In addition, the Commission attempted to
comfort issuers by stating that SEC enforcement actions under Reg. FD
would not occur for mistaken materiality determinations that were not
reckless.1 93 However, the SEC refused to delineate a "bright line" test
and instead, relied on existing case law definitions for materiality.
94
The SEC argued that the materiality standard needed "flexibility" to fit
the facts and circumstances of each case and thus, refused a bright line
rule for fear of the rule being over- or under-inclusive.' 9  The
Commission did provide a non-exclusive list of some types of
information or events that should be reviewed carefully to determine
their materiality; 96 however, the Commission warned that list did not
imply that each of those items were per se material. 97 Further, the SEC
attempted to comfort issuers by stating that issuers are not prohibited
from disclosing non-material information to analysts even if,
unbeknownst to the issuer, the information helps the analysts to
complete a "mosaic" which, in itself, is material.'98
Fifth, the SEC expressly provided that a Reg. FD violation would
not lead to an issuer's loss of eligibility to use short form registration or
its ability to resell under Rule 144 of the Securities Act of 1933.99 This
provision helped ease issuers' concern for collateral consequences of
192. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2004).
193. Id.
194. See Selective Disclosure, supra note 39.
195. Id.
196. See Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-7881, available at http://www.sec.gov/ruleslfinal/33-7881.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Insider Trading] (listing various areas of concern,
such as: earnings information; mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or
changes in assets; new products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers or
suppliers; changes in control or management; change in auditors or auditor notification
that the issuer may no longer rely on an auditor's report; events regarding the issuer's
securities-e.g., defaults on senior securities, stock splits or changes in dividends; and
bankruptcies or receiverships).
197. Id. "By including this list, we do not mean to imply that each of these items is
per se material." Id. "The information and events on this list still require determinations
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Reg. FD violations. To help foreign issuers' concerns about Reg. FD,
the SEC excluded foreign issuers from coverage of the regulation. 200
4. Rez. FD's Operation
As mentioned in part I. A. above, whenever (1) an issuer, or person
acting on its behalf, (2) discloses material nonpublic information, (3) to
certain enumerated persons (broker/dealers, investment advisers,
investment companies, and holders of issuer's securities), (4) the issuer
must make a public disclosure of the same information either (a)
simultaneously in the case of intentional disclosure, or (b) promptly
(generally within 24 hours201) for non-intentional disclosures. 20 2  A
disclosure is considered intentional "when the person making the
disclosure either knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the
information ... is both material and nonpublic. 2 3 No public disclosure
is necessary if (1) the recipient of the information owes a duty of trust or
confidence not to disclose (such as an attorney or accountant), (2)
confidentiality agreement exists, (3) disclosure is made to a credit
agency, or (4) the disclosure is made in connection with a registered
offering under the Securities Act.2°
Rule 101(e) defines the types of acceptable "public disclosure"
satisfying Reg. FD. The rule states that issuers make public disclosure
under Reg. FD by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by disseminating
information "through another method (or combination of methods) of
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-
exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.2 ' The SEC
notes that either filing or furnishing information on Form 8-K to satisfy
Reg. FD will not be deemed an admission as to materiality of that
information.20 6 As such, issuers may choose to "file" a report under
Item 5 of Form 8-K or to "furnish" a report under Item 9 of Form 8-K
200. Id.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (2004) (noting that in cases of non-intentional disclosures
over the weekend or holiday prompt disclosure may be made the later of 24 hours or the
commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange).
202. Id.
203. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2004).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2004).
205. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2004).
206. 17 C.F.R. § 249 (2004).
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that will not be deemed "filed., 20 7 If an issuer chooses to "furnish" the
information, it will not be subject to liability under Section 11 of the
Securities Act or Section 18 of the Exchange Act, unless the issuer
includes the disclosure in a filed report, proxy statement, or registration
statement." 8  Issuers are able to utilize alternative methods or
combination of methods of public disclosure that is "reasonably
designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the
information to the public., 20 9 Acceptable methods include press releases
distributed widely through a news or wire service, or press conferences
or conference calls accessible to the public by listening in person, by
telephone, or other electronic means such as the Internet.10 Issuers must
give the public adequate notice of the conference and adequate means to
access it.21 Although a website, by itself, may not be a sufficient means
of public disclosure, the SEC notes that a website could be a part of a
combination of methods to distribute information to the public.21 2
On March 28, 2003, Regulation G became effective.2 3 Reg. G
requires public companies which disclose or release non-GAAP
financial measures to include in that same disclosure or release, a
presentation of the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure
and a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measure to the most
directly comparable GAAP financial measure.21 4 Reg. FD and Reg. G
operate in tandem. A private communication of material, non-public
information to a corporate outsider triggers a public disclosure
requirement under Reg. FD. If that private communication is of material
information containing a non-GAAP financial measure, Reg. G applies
to that disclosure. For example, if an issuer selectively discloses to an
analyst that its sales per square foot or same store sales (both non-GAAP
financial measures) will increase/decrease, then this disclosure requires
public dissemination: 1) under Reg. FD because material nonpublic
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(2) (2004).
210. See Selective Disclosure, supra note 39.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Final Rule: Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures (Regulation
G), 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 244, 249 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8176.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
214. Id.
2004)
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information was intentionally and selectively disclosed, and 2) under
Reg. G because the disclosure did not include a directly comparable
financial measure presented in accordance to GAAP. 215 Form 8-K was
amended to include Item 12, Disclosure of Results of Operations and
Financial Condition.1 6 Item 12 requires issuers to furnish to the SEC a
Form 8-K within five business days of any public announcement or
release disclosing material non-public information regarding the issuer's
financial condition for an annual or quarterly fiscal period that just
ended.21 7 Item 12 requirements will apply regardless of whether the
release or announcement includes disclosure of a non-GAAP financial
measure.1 8 In the above example, the public issuer who selectively
disclosed non-GAAP information to the analyst would be required to file
a Form 8-K which disclosed the contents of the conversation (to fulfill
Reg. FD) and to provide a comparable GAAP financial measure and a
reconciliation of the private non-GAAP financial measure and the
comparable GAAP financial measure (to fulfill Reg. G).
An issuer who fails to disclose the material information is subject to
SEC Enforcement Actions alleging violations of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Exchange Act and Reg. FD.2 19 The SEC can bring administrative
actions seeking cease-and-desist orders, or file a civil suit with a federal
district court seeking injunctions and money penalties. 220 In addition,
the SEC can specifically charge the individual at the company who
committed the violation, either as a "cause of' the violation in a cease-
and-desist proceeding, or as an aider and abettor of the violation in an
injunctive action., 22' Unlike Rule lOb-5 violations which impose
criminal sanctions, Reg. FD imposes no criminal penalty.
222






219. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a); Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d); Reg. FD, 17 C.F.R. § § 240, 243 and 249.
220. SEC Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules, at




REGULATION FD-FAIRL Y DISRUPTIVE?
II. SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
More than two years after Reg. FD's effective date, the SEC
Enforcement Division brought its first set of enforcement actions under
the rule. On November 25, 2002 the SEC instituted cease-and-desist
orders against Secure Corp., Raytheon, Co., and Siebel Systems.2 4 All
companies settled their actions with the SEC, and only Siebel paid a
$250,000 fine.225
A. Secure Computing Corporation2f6
Secure is a high-technology company that is engaged in selling
Internet security-related products. 27 John McNulty had been the CEO
and Chairman of the Board since July 1999.228 In early 2000, Secure
contracted with a computer networking company ("the buyer") to bundle
Secure's product along with the buyer's network systems.22 9 No public
announcement was made.230 The contract specified that Secure would
not make press releases without the buyer's consent.23' Consent was
contingent upon the buyer's sales force obtaining customer testimonials
and feedback from "beta customers" which could be used in the press
release. 32 On March 6, 2000 at the buyer's request, Secure posted a
224. See In the Matter of Secure Computing Corp. and John McNulty, Exchange Act
Release No. 46895 (Nov. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46895.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter Secure Computing]; In the Matter of Raytheon Company and Franklin A.
Caine, Exchange Act Release No. 46897 (Nov. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46897.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter Raytheon Company]; In the Matter of Siebel Systems, Inc, Exchange Act
Release No. 46896 (Nov. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.govlitigation/admin/34-46897.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter Siebel Systems].
225. See Litigation Release No. 17860 (Nov. 25, 2002), available at
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl7860.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
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private page on its website to allow buyer's sales force and beta
customers to access software downloads.233
Secure Computing invited interest in its stock among institutional
investors through in-person presentations and conference calls. 34
McNulty led many of these meetings.235 On March 6, 2002 McNulty
called from his home a portfolio manager at an investment firm while
McNulty's investor relations director ("IR") listened to the call from her
office. 36  In addition, a salesperson from a brokerage firm
("salesperson") that followed Secure arranged and attended the
telephonic meeting. 37 McNulty was asked questions about the product,
and he asked permission from the IR to answer.2 38 The IR was unaware
McNulty was referring to the buyer and gave permission to speak. 39
McNulty then disclosed the name of the buyer, the agreement between
them, and the secret website address (in violation of buyer's consent
agreement).2 40  During the meeting the IR realized McNulty was
disclosing material nonpublic information yet she did not interrupt
McNulty.24' The conference call finished at 11:00 a.m. (PST). After the
meeting was over, she left a voicemail on McNulty's phone discussing
his disclosure of nonpublic information.242
The CEO's disclosure was the first time the salesperson heard of
the agreement regarding Secure's product. 43 He quickly relayed the
information to his office.244 Afterwards, the managing partner of the
salesperson's brokerage firm e-mailed McNulty to inquire further.245
McNulty returned the e-mail disclosing the secure website address and
exclaimed, "There won't be a[n] announcement/press release until [the
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bad!, 246 Shortly thereafter, McNulty received the IR's voicemail, and
McNulty e-mailed the managing partner requesting that he keep the
information confidential.247 Secure made no public announcement that
day and its stock price rose 8% over the previous day's close.248
The next morning, Secure received many inquiries about the
249
agreement. McNulty did not tell the buyer about his inadvertent
disclosure and plead for consent to a public disclosure.2 0 The buyer did
not agree. 25 1 Later that morning, McNulty had another conference call
with an institutional investor who asked about the agreement with the
buyer.25 2  McNulty confirmed the agreement. Secure's stock price
increased 7% from March 6's close. 253 That same day at 1:40 (PST),
following the market close, Secure issued a press statement disclosing
the agreement with buyer.254 The next day, March 8, Secure's stock rose
another 7% on high volume.255
The SEC charged Secure with violating Reg. FD and McNulty as
the cause of such violation.256 The SEC determined the disclosure was
material and nonpublic.257  It also concluded that the March 6
disclosures were non-intentional, thus requiring Secure to make prompt
disclosure.258  The SEC found that the March 7 disclosure was
intentional because it was made three hours before the press release.259
The SEC concluded the disclosure violated Reg. FD because it was not
made simultaneously to the market.26
The SEC, pursuant to its Section 21(c) of the Exchange Act
authority, ordered Secure to cease and desist from committing and
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Act.26' The SEC used the same authority to order McNulty to cease and
desist from causing any future violations of Reg. FD and Section
13(a).262  No penalties were imposed.263  Both Secure and McNulty
settled and consented to the above order.264
B. Raytheon Compan 265
Raytheon is a leading defense company.266 Franklyn A. Caine was
its Chief Financial Officer from 1999 to 2001.267 Raytheon maintained
internal quarterly earnings per share ("EPS") estimates, which Caine
frequently received. 68 Caine also monitored outsiders' consensus
earnings projections of Raytheon as reported by Thompson
Financial/First Call ("First Call"), a security research firm. 69 On
February 9, 2001, First Call released Raytheon consensus earnings
estimates of $0.31 per share. 270 In mid-February, Raytheon's internal
EPS measured $0.28, or $0.03 lower than consensus estimate.27'
On February 7, 2001, Raytheon conducted a public investor
conference in which it reiterated annual EPS between $1.55 and $1.70
but it did not mention its first quarter EPS.72 After the conference,
Caine ordered his staff to retrieve earnings models from sell-side
analysts who contributed to First Call's consensus estimate. 73 Caine
also ordered his staff to schedule one-on-one conferences to discuss
quarterly projections. 274 Between mid-February and March 5, 2001,
Caine met with 11 of the 13 analysts.275 Caine disclosed that Raytheon's
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seasonality trend found in 2000.276 In other words, Caine disclosed that
one third of its earnings would come in the first half of the year and the
remaining earnings would come in the second half of the year.277
Analysts previously believed Raytheon's earnings would be more
balanced throughout the year.278  They then revised their earnings
estimates by moving more earnings to the second half of the year.279 In
addition, Caine specifically commented on their first quarter
projections.20 For example, Caine told one analyst that his first quarter
projection was "too high."28' Caine told two analysts that their
projections regarding certain Raytheon's business divisions were
"aggressive" or "very aggressive. 282 These analysts lowered their first
quarter revenue and EPS estimates.283 On another occasion, Caine e-
mailed an analyst's assistant who, after a week, still did not revise the
firm's estimates.2  Caine remarked, "When we spoke about your
model, I think we said you should expect our earnings profile to be
about the same as it was in 2000-that is, we generated about one-third
of our EPS in the first half of the year. I notice that you're WAY above
that., 2 5  After the one-on-one conversations, all eleven analysts
downwardly revised their estimates for Raytheon's first quarter EPS and
submitted their revisions to First Call.286 The average downward change
was $0.05 resulting in a new consensus earnings estimate of $0.27.287 In
April of 2001, Raytheon posted first quarter EPS of $0.28, beating The
Street's estimate.288 In a public conference, Raytheon stated that it was
"pleased to report another quarter of progress toward our goal of
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the fifth straight quarter we have met or exceeded our commitments to
you."
2 90
On Feb. 26 and 28, 2001, Caine had a one-on-one conversation
with a sell side analyst who subsequently lowered his first and quarter
291 MaEPS estimates. On March 1, 2001, that analyst participated in a
"morning call" with the firm's institutional sales force.292 That analyst
disclosed to the sales force that 1) he was lowering Raytheon's first
quarter EPS estimate, 2) Raytheon might be suffering from cash flow
problems worse than the Street realized, and 3) to the analyst's belief,
the Washington Group may seek from Raytheon remuneration for the
purchase of a certain Raytheon business.293 After the morning call, the
sales force e-mailed to their institutional clients the substance of the
morning call's discussions.294 That day, institutional clients sold more
than 2 million shares of Raytheon stock.295 After the March 1 morning
call, Raytheon's Class B stock fell 6% and Class A stock fell 3%.296
The SEC charged Raytheon with violating Reg. FD and Caine as
the cause of such violation. 297 The SEC determined the disclosures were
material by reason of the subject matter of the information: earnings
guidance.298 The disclosures were found to be nonpublic because at no
time before or during the first quarter of 2001 did Raytheon publicize
any guidance regarding its first quarter EPS or its 2001 earnings
guidance. 299 The SEC also found that at no time did Raytheon publicly
disclose Caine's earnings guidance disclosures to the analysts.3°
The SEC, pursuant to its Section 21(c) of the Exchange Act
authority, ordered Raytheon to cease and desist from committing and
causing future violations of Reg. FD and Section 13(a) of the Exchange
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desist from causing any future violations of Reg. FD and Section
13(a).3°2 No penalties were imposed.30 3
In one part of this Release, the SEC stated they did not need to
discuss the issue of "whether the trading and price decline of Raytheon's
stock on March 1, 2001 was caused by Raytheon's earnings
disclosures.' 3 °" Evidently, the SEC concluded it had enough evidence
that the disclosures were material without the need to examine whether a
drop in stock price could be a factor to determine materiality in this
case.30 5 In other words, the Commission believed that the materiality of
Caine's nonpublic disclosure was so clear that the movement in
Raytheon's stock was a non-issue.30 6 Furthermore, when Caine told
analysts that their estimates were not in line with Raytheon's internal
projections that alone was enough to find a Reg. FD violation.30 7
C. Siebel Systems, Inc.
308
Siebel Systems, Inc. ("Siebel") is a provider of customer
relationship management (CRM) software and other business
applications.30 9 On October 17, 2001, Siebel posted its third quarter
earnings. 3'° During the third quarter, both sales and earnings had
declined compared to the same quarter the previous year causing it to
miss analysts' earnings estimates.31 In a public conference call,
Siebel's CEO stated, "Things have been tough. We think that they will
be quite tough in the short term. We have an exceptionally soft market
for information technology .... Spending for tech products and
services continues to slide. We expect things will be quite tough
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Three weeks later, an analyst at Goldman Sachs approached Siebel
about participating in a technology conference which featured a
question-and-answer session between Siebel's CEO and the analyst, and
then follow up questions by the audience.31 3 Siebel's CEO agreed to
attend.31 4 Thereafter, Goldman Sachs provided Siebel with a list of
questions the analyst planned to ask including whether Siebel had "any
evidence that the software market [was] getting any better or worse" in
the fourth quarter.3 5 Goldman Sachs also sent an attendance lists of
nearly 200 individuals including broker-dealers, investment advisers,
investment companies and institutional shareholders.31 6
On November 2, 2001, Siebel's CEO and Investment Relations
Director ("IR") had a brief conference call with the analyst to discuss
last minute preparations for the conference on November 5.317 After the
conference and unbeknownst to Siebel, the analyst drafted an internal
report which he circulated within Goldman Sachs which stated, "[a]fter
speaking with management, we think there is a good chance [the
Company's CEO] sets a positive tone at our software conference .... It
seems as if business activity has increased ... and this data point will
likely be taken positively this morning., 318 Later that evening, Siebel's
IR prepared talking points to the CEO and CFO for use at the
technology conference.31 9 The talking points contained only public
information and did not discuss the analyst's question regarding the
software market.320Siebel's CEO attended the technology conference on
November 5.32' After a brief introduction, the analyst moderator asked
the CEO about how the software business looked in October and
whether the customers are getting back to normalcy. 322  The CEO
replied, "[T]he business decisions appear to be quite normal right now,
and so we're pretty optimistic about what we're seeing at this time ....
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buying patterns., 323 The analyst then asked about sales throughout the
previous quarter.324 The CEO replied, "I think the linearity of this Q4
will be about what we saw in Q4 of the previous two years. It was, the
behavior of the market appears normal .... ,325
Siebel did not disclose this information to the public.326 The
conference was not accessible via the Internet nor did the company file a
Form 8-K or make any other public disclosure.327 On October 11, 2001,
several weeks before the technology conference, the IR learned that the
conference would not be webcast.3 28  The IR did not disclose this
information to the CEO.32 9 On the day of the technology conference,
Siebel's stock rose 16.5% higher over the previous day's close. 330 There
was also evidence that attendees purchased stock during the CEO's
question-and-answer session.3 3' The SEC charged Siebel with violating
Reg. FD.332 Siebel knew the conference's attendees were "person[s]
outside the issuer" because it previously received an attending list of
various securities professionals. 333 The SEC determined from the CEO's
comments that the Company was "pretty optimistic" because it was
witnessing "a return to normal behavior in IT buying patterns" and that
"the linearity of this Q4 will be aboutwhat we saw in Q4 of the previous
two years" were material because it altered the total mix of information
to an investor.334 These statements contrasted with his earlier
statements. 335  Then, the CEO stated the company was facing "an
exceptionally soft market for information technology" and that things
would remain "quite tough" for the rest of the year.33 6 The disclosures
were found to be nonpublic because when the CEO made his optimistic
















674 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LA W
his company's own "sales pipeline., 337  The CEO responded to a
question in which the analyst referenced Siebel's use of its own software
to track its "sales pipeline., 338 The SEC also stated Siebel's disclosures
were intentional because it knew or was reckless in not knowing the
disclosures were material and nonpublic where Siebel's IR knew the
technology conference would not be webcast and failed to tell the
CEO.339
The SEC, pursuant to its Section 21(c) of the Exchange Act
authority, ordered Siebel to cease and desist from committing or causing
future violations of Reg. FD and Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act.
Siebel agreed to pay a $250,000 fine.340 What is unknown is why Siebel
agreed to pay the $250,000 fine. It seems that Secure's McNulty
participated in more egregious conduct because he intentionally
disclosed information where Siebel's CEO's disclosure was more
inadvertent. The fact that Siebel's CEO or IR were not made parties to
this administrative proceeding supports the argument that Siebel's
conduct was less malevolent.
D. Analysis of the Enforcement Cases
Unfortunately, the SEC in these enforcement actions did not
provide any more light as to what constitutes materiality. The SEC has
repeated in the past that it is not their role to define materiality. The
SEC has deferred to the common law definition of materiality.341 In
these cases, material disclosures were not hard to find. In Secure Corp.
the sales agreement disclosure would likely alter the total mix of
information available to an investor. In both Raytheon and Siebel,
earnings disclosures would be considered important to an investor in
making an investment decision. The SEC also based its materiality
determinations upon what the recipients of the selectively disclosed





341. See Selective Disclosure, supra note 39 (quoting TSC Indus. V. Northway Inc.,
426 U.S. 439,449 (1971)).
REGULATION FD-FAIRL Y DISRUPTIVE?
volume of the issuer's stock after private disclosure.342 For example, in
Siebel's case, the SEC carefully detailed Siebel's stock price reaction
during the CEO's presentation at the technology conference and noted
that several analysts purchased large blocks of stock during the
presentation.343 Thus, a company can monitor market reaction after a
private disclosure to help it make a materiality determination. If the
market reacts, it is more likely the information was material and an
immediate public disclosure should be contemplated.
Another concern for companies is that their confidential business
transactions can cause Reg. FD problems. 3" Secure was stuck between
a rock and a hard place because it was under a contractual obligation to
not disclose the deal and yet because of the beta testing it had to post
some information on its website.345 Issuers should negotiate contractual
provisions to allow public disclosure if mandated by Reg. FD.
Companies should also watch their use of code words as in the
Motorola case discussed earlier in this Article.346 In Motorola, the IR
told the analyst that "significant" meant "25%."347  The SEC again
highlighted that it considers earnings guidance to be problematic.348
Motorola told the analyst that revenue would decrease "significantly"(i.e., "125%"1).34
What is more problematic is that the SEC named Secure's CEO's as
a defendant and the SEC failed to include the IR.350 The facts stated that
the IR gave permission for the CEO to speak in response to the portfolio
manager's question.35' Only during the CEO's response did the IR
notice the CEO asked permission regarding another subject matter.352
The SEC said that the IR acted on behalf of the issuer353 thereby
342. See, e.g., Siebel Systems, supra note 224 (noting the positive effects on
Siebel's stock after Siebel's CEO delivered a speech at the technology conference).
343. See id.
344. See Secure Computing, supra note 224.
345. Id.
346. See Motorola, supra note 1.
347. Id.
348. See id. (warning against the selective disclosure of earnings information during
private conversations with analysts).
349. Id.
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imputing her liability to the issuer, Secure. It seems that the IR should
share in some responsibility for the disclosure yet she was not named.
Perhaps the SEC only named Secure's CEO because he was the one who
made the verbal disclosure. The SEC's punishment in the Secure,
Siebel, and Raytheon cases were relatively light compared to other
enforcement actions.354 Motorola probably did not receive a cease-and-
desist order because it relied on good faith on the erroneous opinion of
its general counsel.355 The SEC warned that corporate executives cannot
always rely on its general counsel because they may have "a keener
awareness than company counsel of the significance of information to
investors.
356
Reg. FD punishment is expected to become more stem in the
future.357 Professor Miller believes punishments will become more
severe over time once executives become more familiar with Reg. FD.358
But, he does recognize that hard cases will realize in the future over
efforts to punish more-ambiguous statements. 359 "The hard case is going
to come up... when the atmospherics do say something indirectly.
That's going to be the proving ground.' ' 360 The author notes that cease-
and-desist sanctions may have little deterrent effects because unlike
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violations, Reg. FD has no criminal
penalties.361 If Raytheon, Secure, or Siebel violate Reg. FD again, they
cannot receive criminal punishment.362 These companies may have no
incentive to comply with Reg. FD because its punishment "has no
teeth. 3
63
354. See, e.g., In the Matter of Microstrategy, Exchange Act Release No. 43724
(Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-43724.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004) (noting that in addition to several cease-and-desist orders, the
SEC ordered the company to take substantial affirmative steps including implementing
changes in corporate governance to prevent improper revenue recognition.)
355. See Motorola, supra note 1.
356. Id.
357. Geoffrey Miller, Schering-Plough Faces SEC Case On Private Chats, WALL
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III. POST-REG. FD EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Since Reg. FD's enactment, numerous studies have been conducted
to assess the rule's impact on the market.364 Many studies have been
conducted to analyze whether commentators' fears about Reg. FD were
warranted. True to her word, Commissioner Unger convened a
roundtable discussion to monitor the impact of Reg. FD and
commissioned a study.
3 65
A. Commissioner Unger Revisited
At a public meeting adopting Reg. FD, the SEC agreed to monitor
the rule to determine if it chilled corporate communications or had any
other negative consequences.36  The Commission convened a
roundtable discussion on April 24, 2001, six months after Reg. FD's
effective date, where it heard from issuers, analysts, investors, law
professors, and SEC Staff.3 67 After the roundtable, Commissioner Unger
continued to monitor Reg. FD and later issued a report which
summarized the views of the roundtable discussion, identified issues of
concern, and made recommendations for improving Reg. FD.368
Unger reported that the issue of materiality dominated roundtable
discussions.369 Panelists expressed concern about what kinds of
"earnings information" may be deemed material. Concerns concentrated
on three items: confirmation of prior guidance, disclosure of product-
related and other non-financial information, and correcting outdated
analyst estimates.370  In addition, panelists requested clarification
364. See, e.g., Securities Industry Association, Costs and Benefits of Regulation Fair
Disclosure (May 17, 2001), available at
http://anasazi.umsl.edu/FIN455/SEC/RegFD.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
365. See Commissioner Lara S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure
Revisited (Dec. 6, 2001), at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Unger, Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited].
366. See SEC Special Studies, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies.shtml
(last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
367. Id.
368. See Unger, Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited, supra note 365.
369. Id.
370. The panelists' concerns were justified. Their concerns regarding confirmation
of prior guidance, disclosure of product-related and other non-financial information,
2004]
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regarding whether plant and factory tours would trigger Reg. FD
disclosure obligations. Unger recommended the Commission draft an
interpretive release to discuss the Commission's position on materiality
further and to address the concerns of the panelists. The commissioner
also suggested that if future enforcement actions are brought, the SEC
could use that opportunity to discuss its views on materiality under Reg.
FD. As discussed in the previous section, the SEC failed to provide
additional guidance on materiality. Although the Commission sought to
quell fears about Reg. FD liability in the roundtable discussions, Unger
stated that few issuers and corporate counsel have taken comfort from
the SEC's assurances. The roundtable revealed that most panelists
agreed that uncertainty regarding materiality has urged them to err on
the side of caution. This uncertainty, proponents argued, makes it
difficult for analysts to complete the mosaic.
Commissioner Unger also noted concerns by issuers who requested
more options in publicly disclosing information because the SEC does
not allow website postings alone to satisfy Reg. FD. Unger also heard
complaints that although Reg. FD provides a number of choices for
issuers to disseminate information, current SRO rules prescribe issuers'
use of press releases to disclose material information thus eliminating
Reg. FD's flexibility. Unger recommended that the Commission work
with SROs and more openly embrace technology to allow noticed
website postings, publicly accessible webcasts, and electronic mail
alerts.
The roundtable discussions revealed debate regarding whether more
information was available after Reg. FD. Some issuers stated more
information was available whereas sell-side analysts stated the opposite.
In addition, both sides disagreed as to whether Reg. FD led to a decline
in quality of information. Certain panelists articulated that some issuers
used the rule as a shield to hide information and that some issuers have
resorted to scripted presentations. Although eight surveys discussing the
quantity/quality debate were reviewed, these surveys had differing
results. As a result of the panelist discussions, Unger recommended in
her report that the Commission examine both the amount and type of
information being disclosed by issuers through Form 8-K's, webcasts,
filings, press releases, and other modes of dissemination.
and correcting outdated analyst estimates were in fact the subject of the SEC
enforcement actions. See Unger, Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited, supra note 365.
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Unger concluded her report by noting that although Reg. FD may
have accomplished its goal of equal access to information, that goal may
have come at a great cost. Unger notes how some issuers, investors, and
analysts state that Reg. FD has "caused issuers to say nothing, analysts
to hear nothing, and investors to see nothing." "' Unger believed that
once the Commission made it more clear which types of information it
wanted issuers to disclose to the public, dialogue between issuers and
analysts would increase which would bring more information to the
market place. In addition, Unger recommended the Commission should
expand and clarify ways issuers may use technology to disclose
nonpublic information.
B. Information Overload
Some commentators believe that Reg. FD would cause issuers to
disclose too much, rather than not enough. Many commentators
predicted that Reg. FD would cause companies to disclose "minutia.' 372
One potential negative impact of Reg. FD argued by various
commentators was that the rule would produce significantly greater
information available to the public resulting in an "information
overload., 373 Companies may decide to err on the side of caution by
disclosing both material and non-material information.3 74 Opponents of
the rule forecasted that Reg. FD would produce a torrential flow of
information to address the materiality issue by issuers releasing
information regarding everything and anything.375
Investors already have difficulty parsing the voluminous amounts
of financial information available on the Internet. One recent estimate
found that "every online investor has access to over three billion pieces
of financial data," and "those who are willing to pay have access to over
371. See id.
372. See, e.g., Adam Lashinsky, Reg. FD Is Catching On, TheStreet.com (Nov. 9,
2000) (stating companies will disclose more at first then return to normalcy), available
at http://www.thestreet.com/siliconstreet/1 16485 .html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
373. See Unger, Rethinking Disclosure, supra note 169 (discussing adverse effects
of too much information in the market).
374. Id.
375. See General Rule, supra note 13, at 51,716.
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280 billion pieces. 376 Sophisticated investors such as analysts routinely
scour tomes to retrieve and interpret relevant data. But are lay investors
capable of performing the same work? Although lay investors may be
technologically sophisticated to use the Internet, they may not be
sophisticated enough to make appropriate investment decisions. An
abundance of information does not ensure that investors can effectively
digest that information. Psychological studies show that individuals are
more likely to make decisions based on easily recalled information
rather than "more complete data sets. 3 77  Therefore, individuals
overreact to recent or vivid information. 378 This overreaction leads to
overconfidence in an individual's predictive abilities. They overstate
their ability to see future trends, and understate the risks involved.379
Studies show that when individuals are given more information, their
confidence in their predictions outpaces the accuracy of their
predictions.38° Overconfidence leads to many undesirable effects.
Overconfident investors may not properly diversify their portfolios
because they are "sure" they are picking the right stocks.38'
Overconfident investors tend to trade too much because they purchase
stocks they believe are winners.382  The studies conclude:
"Overconfident investors will overestimate the value of their private
information, causing them to trade too actively and, consequently, to
earn below-average returns. 383 The researchers note that the time it
takes for investors "to become rational" depend on the level of
feedback.3 84 They note the process is quicker for portfolio managers as
376. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Internet and Investor, J. ECON. PERSP.
41,46 (2001).
377. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 859 (1992).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See Barber & Odean, supra note 376, at 46.
381. Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, The Perils for Investors of Human Nature,
FIN. TIMEs, June 15, 2001, available at http://www.johnlaxmi.com/FTGervais.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2004).
382. Id.
383. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FN. 773, 800
(2000).
384. Gervais & Odean, supra note 381.
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opposed to lay investors because portfolio managers are often subject to
frequent portfolio reviews." 5
Recent studies support the idea that issuers are disclosing more
information.31 6  Whether these disclosures are resulting in an
information overload is still unknown. Although issuers are disclosing
more information through Form 8-K's, many analysts believe the depth
of information disclosed is rather shallow.
C. Decreased Corporate Communications with Analysts
As noted in Section I. C. 2. supra, analysts add value to the
marketplace by using their skill, intuition, and perception to "ferret out"
seemingly innocuous bits of information to a lay investor and to piece
together information into a "mosaic" that is comprehensible and
meaningful to lay investors.38 7 Unfortunately, Reg. FD has negatively
affected the relationships between issuers and analysts.388 In a speech at
a conference by Commissioner Unger, she noted that Reg. FD adversely
affected analyst and issuer relationships.38 9 Unger stated that analysts no
longer have access to information that was available before Reg. FD and
that this result leads to less accurate earnings targets. 390  Three
independent surveys have confirmed Unger's belief A survey of 577
companies conducted by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI)
found that 24% of companies are providing less information following
the enactment of Reg. FD. 39' Louis Thompson, President and CEO of
NIRI, stated, "Earnings guidance has become a risky area," making
some companies reluctant to share information.392  In addition,
385. Id.
386. Jeff D. Opdyke, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect of "Fair Disclosure" Rule-
Regulation Is Altering the Way Analysts Approach Their Jobs, Analysts Feel Shackled
by the New Regulations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at Cl.
387. See Arthur Zeikel letter, supra note 56.
388. See Opdyke, supra note 386, at Cl.
389. Laura S. Unger, Fallout From Regulation FD, Has the SEC Finally Cut the
Tightrope?, Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks Conference on SEC Regulation FD,
(Oct. 27, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch421.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
390. Id.
391. Lee Barney, Reg FD: Not-So-Full Disclosure, TheStreet.com, Feb. 26, 2001, at
http://www.thestreet.com/funds/investing/1320727.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
392. Id.
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companies are less likely to review analysts' earnings estimates. The
NIRI survey found that only 53% of companies review analysts'
estimates after Reg. FD whereas 81% of companies reviewed estimates
before Reg. FD.393 The companies that do review earnings models,
however, only check for historical and factual accuracy.394 Companies
have not completely eliminated one-on-one meetings with analysts.
NIRI found that 74% of companies are still meeting privately with
analysts despite the SEC's previous warning that issuing companies
risked violating Reg. FD for one-on-one discussions.
395
An extensive survey by the Securities Industry Association (SIA) of
broker-dealers, general counsels of public companies, individual
investors, and SIA firms found that out of the analysts surveyed, two-
thirds said the companies they covered "communicated less. 396  In
addition, 72% of analysts reported that the quality of information has
declined.397 90% of analysts stated companies would not talk about
information that was not disclosed in press releases, Web casts, or Form
8-K's. 3 98 69% of sell-side analysts reported that they could no longer
gather all the information to "complete the mosaic. 399 "
On January 31, 2001, The Association for Investment Management
and Research (AIMR) conducted a Reg. FD survey seeking information
from 6,142 analyst and portfolio manager respondents. 57% of those
surveyed believe the volume of substantive information from the
companies they research has decreased since Reg. FD.4 °° Only 14%
393. Id.
394. Investor Relations Compliance Report, Regulation FD: Firms Alter Disclosure
Practices, at http://www.irzone.com/irc/ircr040l-2.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
395. National Investor Relations Institute, National Investor Relations Institute
Releases Survey Results on the Impact of SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, at
http://www.niri.org/irresource_pubs/alerts/ea070201.cfm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)
[hereinafter NIRI Survey].
396. Securities Industry Association, SIA Survey Participants Say Reg FD's
"Chilling Effect" on "Quantity," "Quality" of Information Puts Investors at a




400. Association for Investment Management and Research, Analysts, Portfolio
Managers Say Volume, Quality of Information Have Fallen Under Regulation FD,
AIMR Member Survey Shows, Mar. 26, 2001, available at
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found that the volume of substantive information increased.40 ' 56% of
respondents reported that the quality of information disclosed by
companies has decreased.40 2 81% of respondents agreed that with the
enactment of Reg. FD, companies that want to minimize communication
with investors can do so more effectively as compared to 27% of
respondents who believed companies want to maximize
communication.4 3 AIMR found that 43% of investment professional
respondents had less confidence in the accuracy of their earnings
forecasts since Reg. FD's enactment 4°4. An AIMR Senior Vice
President who directs professional standards for AIMR's members
remarked, "Clearly, many of our members feel that too many of our
companies are taking an excessively conservative stance and
misinterpreting the new regulation to mean they should have no one-to-
one or small-group communication with anyone at all." 405
Recent studies regarding the "chilling" of corporate disclosure are
mixed. Professor Eric Zitzewitz concluded that Reg. FD reduced
selective disclosure of future earnings to analysts without reducing the
total amount of information disclosed.40 6 Professors Christopher Blake
and Patricia Williams found similar results.40 7 They found that the level
of management quarterly earnings forecasts increased post Reg. FD with
no corresponding decrease in the quality of information provided.4 8
The professors also found that the quality of corporate disclosures
increased. 409
The author notes that Blake and Williams equated corporate
disclosure with corporate earnings forecasts when conducting their
study. Earnings forecasts are not the only types of information Reg. FD
http://www.aimr.com/pressroom/Olreleases/regfdsurvey.html (last visited Mar. 27,





405. Id. (emphasis in original).
406. Eric Zitzewitz, Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Private Information of
Analysts (Apr. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
407. Christopher R. Blake & Patricia A. Williams, Does Reg. FD Have a "Chilling
Effect" on the Quantity and Quality of Corporate Information? (Nov. 2002)
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critics claim issuers are more reluctant to disclose after Reg. FD's
effective date. Analysts inquire about other types of information aside
from earnings forecasts. Recall in Commissioner Unger's report that
she recommended the Commission examine both the amount and type of
information being disclosed by issuers through Form 8-K's, webcasts,
filings, press releases, and other modes of information. The author has
not found any studies that measured the frequency of these disclosures.
Although Blake and Williams found that the quality and quantity of
corporate disclosures has improved post Reg. FD, their study is limited
to the analysis of only one type of corporate disclosure: earnings
forecasts.
Another study supports the contention that corporate disclosure has
not been chilled. This study utilized conference call data and not
earnings forecasts data to find their conclusion. Professors Brian
Bushee, Dawn Matsumoto, and Gregory Miller found no evidence that
Reg. FD reduced the amount of information disclosed during public
access to conference calls.41° Other studies found different conclusions.
Professors Andreas Gintschel and Stanimir Markov determined that the
absolute price impact of financial analysts' forecasts is lower than 20%,
suggesting Reg. FD reduced the amount of private information disclosed
by managers to analyst.41 In addition, although Professors Venkat
Eleswarapu, Rex Thompson, and Kumar Venkataraman concluded that
Reg. FD has caused information asymmetry to increase, they noted that
"information flow around mandatory announcements has decreased but
overall information flow is unchanged.
4 12
Although the weight of the evidence from these empirical studies
seems to indicate that the quantity of information has not been chilled,
410. Brian J. Bushee et al., Managerial and Investor Responses to Disclosure
Regulation: The Case of Reg FD and Conference Calls (Oct. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://accounting.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/bmm2-
1003.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
411. Andreas Gintschel & Stanimir Markov, The Effectiveness of Regulation FD
(July 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.goizueta.emory.edu/upload/86/GintschelMarkov.pdf (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
412. Venkat R. Eleswarapu et al., The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure:
Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry (Oct. 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
available at
http://www.fininter.net/internet-securities/Disclosure/FD%20impact%20on%20trading
%20costs.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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perhaps the quality of information has decreased. The majority of these
studies are limited in scope and utility because they focus only on
earnings forecasts and not other forms of corporate disclosures that
analysts believe have been chilled. Further, aside from the Williams and
Blake study, the studies do not measure the quality of information.
These studies do, however, suggest that issuers themselves are
disclosing more internal earnings forecasts to the public. Until further
research is conducted measuring other forms of corporate disclosures,
we only have the NIRI, SIA, and AIMR surveys and the results of
studies revolving around earnings forecasts.
D. Volatilit
The connection between volatility and Reg. FD stems from the
rule's affect on quantity and quality of information.1 3 Commentators
frequently expressed concerns that corporations are erring on the side of
caution in not providing earnings guidance to stock analysts.41 4 When
analysts are unable to modify their earnings models, uncertainty in the
market increases in which this higher risk is reflected in lower stock
valuations.4 5 Instead of corporate information slowly leaking into the
market place via its communications with analysts allowing for gradual
stock price movements, public disclosures sometimes act as a dramatic
bombshell on stock prices.41 6 When investors react to information that is
released to the market at once, the markets suffer from severe price
swings.41 7
An example of the relation between Reg. FD and increased market
volatility occurred in August, 2000. Intel realized its revenue targets
413. India: Regulation FD May Create Insiders' Black Market, Bus. LINE (THE
HINDU), Nov. 5, 2000, available at 2000 WL 30106960 [hereinafter, India].
414. Regulation Fair Disclosure: Hearing Before the House Sub-Comm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 107th Cong. (May 17,
2001) (statement of Daniel P. Hann, on behalf of the Association of Publicly Traded
Companies) (on file with author) [hereinafter, Hann's Statement].
415. See India, supra note 413.
416. Miriam Hill, New Rule Aims to Keep Investors in the Know, but Wall Street
Analysts Wonder How It Will Affect Their Work, CHI. TRI3., Nov. 21, 2000, at C3.
417. Alex Frew McMillan, Reg FD's Fallout, CNNFN, Nov. 14, 2000, at
http://money.cnn.com/2000/11/14/investing/q_regfda/index.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
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would not be met for the third-quarter.41 8 To comply with Reg. FD, Intel
publicly announced this information instead of selectively disclosing to
its analysts. 419 Intel stock price fell 22%.420 A record 300 million shares
were traded and $91 billion dollars in market capitalization was lost.421
In addition, Proctor and Gamble and Eli Lilly both lost 30% in market
capitalization in a single day.422 Forty seven other companies in 2000
dropped 20% or more of their market capitalization in a single day.423
Just under half of those crashes came in April 2000.424 These dramatic
price swings certainly do not instill investor confidence in the
marketplace.
The concern for volatility arises for four reasons: (1) an increase in
volatility will increase the expected risk premium thereby affecting a
firm's cost of capital;421 (2) greater volatility in firm value increases
compensating differential required to retain corporate management; 426
(3) value of stock options is reduced as aggregate market volatility
increases; 42 7 and (4) gives politicians an excuse to meddle in the
markets.4 28
The AIMR survey found that 71% of respondents believed that
Reg. FD has contributed to market volatility: a lot (25%), some (34%),
or a little (12%).429 Many of these respondents attribute the volatility to
418. Richard Richtmyer, Intel Warning Clobbers Stock, CNNFN, Sept. 21, 2000, at
http://money.cnn.com/2000/09/21/technology/intel/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
419. Id.
420. Alex Frew McMillan, Year of the Big Stock Drop, CNNFN, Oct. 12, 2000, at





425. Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Market Volatility: Causes and Consequences, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 953 (1989) (citing French, Schwert & Stambaugh, Expected Stock
Returns and Volatility, 19 J. FIN. EcoN. 3 (1987)).
426. See id. at 956 (citing Clifford W. Smith & R. Stulz, The Determinants of Firm's
Hedging Policies, 20 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSiS 391 (1985)).
427. Id. (citing Clifford W. Smith & R.L. Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of US.
Executive Compensation Plans, 7 AUSTRALIAN J. MGMT. 139 (1982)).
428. Id.
429. See AIMR Survey, supra note 400.
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a lessening of earnings guidance and which lead to more earnings
430
surprises.
Recent studies overwhelmingly conclude stock price volatility has
increased after Reg. FD's effective date. Some studies have shown a
correlation between higher stock market volatility and Reg. FD.43' One
recent study found that stock price volatility was higher during public
conference calls than private conference calls.432 The researchers found
that volatility was 50% higher during public conference calls.433
Professor Matsumoto acknowledged that she did not know what caused
the increased volatility but remarked, "Whenever more information is
disclosed there is an increase in price volatility .... All we can say is
that greater volatility is consistent with many managers' concerns that
allowing smaller, less savvy investors open access to information could
lead to misunderstandings that would lead investors to sell their shares
in the company., 435 Another study discovered similar results. A study
by Professor Selim Topaloglu found that for positive earnings surprises,
price sensitivity to missed earnings targets is larger post-Reg. FD.436 On
the other hand, Topaloglu found that the markets do not respond to
negative earnings surprises much differently in the Reg. FD era.437
Topaloglu believes this is attributed to the reported increase in earnings
warnings pre-announcements after Reg. FD.438
430. Id.
431. Mark I. Schwartz & Jane K.P. Tam, Fair Disclosure: How Reg FD stifles
market efficiency, FIN.POST, Nov. 21, 2001 (noting increased volatility is a consequence
of information being disclosed in "fits and starts").
432. University of Washington, Controversial SEC Regulation and Small Investors,
Dec. 12, 2001, at http://www.newswise.com/articles/2001/7/REGFD.UWA.html (last




436. Selim Topaloglu, An Examination of Institutional Trading Activity Before and
After Regulation FD, Arizona State University (May 2002) (unpublished manuscript),
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E. Negative Effects on Smaller Corporations
Corporate relations with securities analysts are very important for
small companies because analysts provide market interest in the
companies.439 Many smaller companies rely heavily on analyst forums
to gain coverage of their stocks.440 Some critics argue that Reg. FD will
decrease the amount of information smaller companies disclose at these
forums resulting in less popularity of these companies. 4 ' In a hearing
before Congress, Daniel P. Hann, representing the Association of
Publicly Traded Companies testified that Reg. FD would have a
disproportionate impact on small and new public companies.442 Hann
conveyed that small companies often struggle to get coverage by stock
analysts." 3 Hann further declared, "It is a simple function of human
nature that an analyst with only marginal interest in a company will react
negatively to being told, 'Let me get back to you on that question after I
talk to my lawyer.""'4
F. Decreased Analyst Earnings Forecast Accuracy
Professors Shyam Sunder and Partha Mohanram found that after
Reg. FD's effective date, analysts earnings forecast errors increased. 45
Their study showed that analysts' raw absolute error increased from 4.9
cents in the pre-FD period to around 6.2 cents in the post-FD period." 6
This amounts to a 26.53% increase in analysts' error. In addition, the
study confirmed that analysts' forecast dispersion, or the standard
deviation of forecasts at any particular point in time, had increased
439. Heidi Elliot, Is Fair Disclosure a Foul Deal? Analysts Say New Securities and
Exchange Commission Regulation Could Backfire, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Oct. 2, 2000, at
4, available at 2000 WL 9581412.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. See Hann's Statement, supra note 414.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Partha S. Mohanram & Shyam V. Sunder, Full Disclosure, STERN BUSINESS,
Fall/Winter 2000, available at
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/Sternbusiness/fallwinter_2002/fulldisclosure.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004).
446. Id.
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significantly. 44 7 The professors downplayed the significance of these
findings by noting that macroeconomic factors, such as the Internet bust,
probably contributed more to the increased analyst error and forecast
dispersion than Reg. FD.448 The professors also noted that analysts are
reducing the number of firms they are covering which is consistent with
their need to conduct more research.449 Another study discovered that
earnings forecasts issued early in quarters after Reg. FD are less accurate
than in quarter's prior to Reg. FD.450
Professors Anup Agrawal and Sahiba Chadha found similar results
in their studies concerning accuracy. 45t  They found that earnings
forecasts became less accurate post-Reg. FD at both the individual
analyst and consensus levels.452 The two concluded that the effect was
particularly pronounced in small and lesser followed firms, firms with
losses, and firms in technology and consumable durables sectors.4 3 The
study also confirmed Sunder and Mohanram's assertion that analysts'
forecast dispersion increased post-Reg. FD.454 Professor Topaloglu
found that analysts' forecast dispersion doubled after Reg. FD's
enactment.
These studies prove that analysts' earnings forecasts for individual
companies are becoming less accurate. If issuers are disclosing earnings
information to the public through the press and not through analysts,
then the above results are not surprising. Analysts do have a right to
complain if they no longer are receiving data inputs from issuers for
analysts' earnings models. Then again, Reg. FD proponents argue that
analysts cannot complain about having to do more research because that




450. Philip Shane et al., Earnings and Price Discovery in the Post-Reg. FD
Information Environment: A Preliminary Analysis (Nov. 15, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
451. Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Who Is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and
Performance of Sell-Side Analysts Following the SEC's Fair Disclosure Rule (Feb.
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
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IV. THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET HYPOTHESIS
A. Background
For years, economists have been interested in the pricing of
securities in established capital markets. The prevailing view of how
financial markets work is the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
(ECMH). 455 Three forms of the ECMH exist.45 6 The weak form states
that the current market price of a security traded in the market reflects
all data about the security's earlier prices.457 The strong form posits that
a security's price incorporates all information, regardless of whether the
information is generally available to the public.4 ' The semi-strong
form, the most widely accepted, states that a security's current price
reflects all currently available public information. 419  "When new
information becomes available, the market absorbs and discounts it
instantaneously and efficiently.
' 460
The semi-strong form holds that it is impossible for an investor to
purchase an "undervalued" or "overvalued" stock because all publicly
available information is already reflected in the stock price. For
example, when an investor purchases a stock at price X, he does so
because he feels the stock is worth more than what he pays. But if the
market is efficient and stock price X reflects all public knowledge, then
buying and selling the stock in an attempt to outperform the market will
be more of a game of chance rather than skill. In other words, you
cannot beat the market. Professor Burton Malkiel once wrote that
ECMH "holds that since all available information is quickly factored
into stock prices, all stocks present equal chances for gains. Taken to its
logical extreme... [the theory] means that a blindfolded monkey
throwing darts at a newspaper's financial pages could select a portfolio
455. ROBERT H. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATION FINANCE: CASES
AND MATERIALS 36 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing ECMH).
456. JAMES H. LORIE & MARY T. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND




460. HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 455, at 36.
REGULATION FD-FAIRL Y DISRUPTIVE?
29461that would do just as well as one carefully selected by the experts.
ECMH is a theory followed and studied so thoroughly that "there is no
other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence
supporting it than the efficient market hypothesis. 462
B. Eugene Fama: The Father ofECMH
Although capital market efficiency has been the subject of research
since the early 1900's, Eugene Fama's 1970 article on capital markets
provided the first full discourse on ECMH.463  Eugene Fama was an
early pioneer and advocate of the efficient market hypothesis. 4  Fama
argued that in an active market including many well-informed and
intelligent investors, securities will be fairly valued reflecting all public
knowledge.465 In other words, the market accurately assesses the worth
of particular information and is not misled by seemingly unrelated and
inconsequential bits of information.466 To properly assess information,
one must know the information one is assessing. In fact, Fama wrote,
"In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent
participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices
of individual securities already reflect the effects of information based
both on events that have already occurred and on events, which, as of
now, the markets expects to take place in the future. In other words...
at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good estimate
of its intrinsic value. 46 7  The "intelligent participants" that Fama is
referring to are market insiders such as financial analysts. Fama further
argued that in an efficient market, no information or analysis can help an
investor outperform a benchmark index.468 Aside from intelligent or
461. Georgette Jansen, Journal's Dartboard Retires After 14 Years of Stock Picks,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2002, at Cl.
462. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1984).
463. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
464. See Investor Home, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Random Walk
Theory, at http://www.investorhome.com/emh.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
465. Id.
466. See HAMILTON & BooTH, supra note 455, at 36.
467. Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks In Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Sep./Oct. 1965, at 55.
468. Id.
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"rational" investors, another assumption of the ECMH is that "perfect
469pricing" exists. If "perfect pricing" is a fiction, then markets cannot
reach the equilibrium price necessary for ECMH's validity. A third
assumption is that news travels instantaneously. 470 A stock price cannot
instantaneously reflect market information unless the transmission of
that information is also instantaneous. Last, ECMH assumes no one
possesses monopolistic power over the market that leads to large
buying.471
C. Criticisms and Alternate Models
These assumptions have often been criticized. A world-renowned
investor, Warren Buffet, has quipped, "I'd be a bum in the street with a
tin cup if the markets were efficient.' '472 Economic studies have shown
that "noise trading" or trading on irrelevant data often occurs in the
markets.473 Noise theorists believe that many market participants act
irrationally because they suffer "testable cognitive biases that impede
their collective ability to coldly calculate the intrinsic value of
securities." 474 Another theory focusing on irrationality is called "herd
behavior" where irrational investors buy and sell based upon whether
other irrational investors are buying and selling.475  Some research
suggests that security prices do not instantaneously reflect available
469. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 180-81 (4th ed.
1985).
470. Id. at 181.
471. Id.
472. Philip S. Russel & Violet M. Torbey, The Efficient Market Hypothesis on Trial:
A Survey, at http://www.westga.edu/-bquest/2002/market.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2004).
473. See, e.g., Richard A. Crowell & Edgar E. Peters, Chaos Theory Weakens
Efficient Market Idea, Pensions & Investments, June 10, 1991, at 14; Bruce N.
Lehmann, Fads, Martingales and Market Efficiency, 105 Q. J. ECON. 1, 25 (1990).
474. Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets Undervalue Stock: CAPM and ECMH
Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 478
(1997).
475. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (Summer 2000) (discussing herd behavior of business
executives).
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public information but adjust to information slowly, over time.47 6 For
example, one study showed that dividend announcements produced a
drift in share prices extending for periods up to twelve months.477 Some
studies have established "anomalies" or pockets of inefficiency, which
should not exist in an efficient market.478 One anomaly known as the
"weekend effect" demonstrates that Monday's closing stock prices are
frequently lower than the previous Friday's closing stock prices.479
Another documented anomaly is the neglected-firm effect.4 0 This effect
states that companies, whose stock is not held by large institutional
investors or followed by many financial analysts, will experience above-
average rates of return.48 '
D. The Importance of ECMH
Efficient pricing is crucial for achieving the efficient allocation of
resources in the economy.482 Inefficient pricing can lead to decreased
liquidity and increased risk.483 Inefficient pricing can also lead to
secondary effects on the economy. Stock investors perceive the market
value of stocks as a determinant of wealth. An unexpected decline in
476. Dan Givoly & Josef Lakonishok, The Information Content of Financial
Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: Some Evidence on Semi-Strong Inefficiency, 1 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 165 (1979).
477. Stewart L. Brown, Earnings Changes, Stock Prices and Market Efficiency, 33 J.
FIN. 17 (1978) (showing two-month drift in prices based on data from 1963-1971); Guy
Charest, Dividend Information, Stock Returns and Market Efficiency-I, 6 J. FIN. ECON.
297 (1978) (showing 12-month adjustment period based on data from 1947-1967);
Henry A. Latane & Charles P. Jones, Standardized Unexpected Earnings-1971-77, 34
J.FIN.717 (1979) (showing three-month drift in prices based on data from 1971-1977).
478. See G. William Schwert, Size and Stock Returns and Other Empirical
Regularities, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1983); see also Sanjoy Basu, The Relationship
Between Earnings' Yields, Market Value, and Return for NYSE Common Stocks:
Further Evidence, 12 J.FN ECON. 129 (1983).
479. D.W. French, Stock Returns and the Weekend Effect, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 55 (1980).
480. Avner Arbel, Generic Stock: An Old Product in a New Package, J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT., Summer 1985, at 4.
481. Id. at 5-6.
482. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock
Prices, 41 DuKE L. J. 977, 979 (1992) (providing a comprehensive framework for
analyzing the benefits of a wide range of securities laws directed toward enhancing
stock price accuracy).
483. Id. at 1034.
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stock market values may lead to an investor's perception in loss of
wealth which may lead to decreased spending and consumption.4 4 An
aggregate decrease in spending may lead to a lower rate of economic
growth which, if combined with other factors, may lead to economic
recession.485 For example, although the stock market crash of 1987 did
not lead to an economic recession, it probably had a depressing effect on
economic activity.
4 6
Despite its criticism, ECMH is the prevalent economic view of
securities pricing and is a major premise for a substantial body of
corporate and securities law and scholarship. The Securities Exchange
Commission itself has relied expressly on the ECMH for justifying its
rules establishing the integrated-disclosure system and rules authorizing
shelf registration of securities.487 The SEC has also recognized ECMH
when formulating Reg. FD.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
ECMH in securities fraud cases. In Basic v. Levinson,488 the Court had
to decide whether an individual shareholder suing an issuer for fraud
who did not rely personally on the issuer's alleged public misstatements,
could presume reliance where he purchased the issuer's stock. The
shareholder claimed he relied on the integrity of the issuer's stock price
because of the market's "efficiency" in incorporating available
information into the stock price including the issuer's alleged public
misstatements.489
484. Id.
485. Kahan, supra note 482, at 1035.
486. Id. at 1036 (citing Report of the Presidential Task Force On Market
Mechanisms 66 (1988), at VII-3).
487. Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889,
52,892 (1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 230) (noting that integrated disclosure "recognizes
the applicability of the efficient market theory" to publicly traded companies, and
relying on same theory to justify shelf registration); Adoption of Integrated Disclosure
Systems, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,382 n.9 (1982)
(codified in several parts of 17 C.F.R.) (relying on notion "that information regularly
furnished to the marketplace... may be reflected in the price of the outstanding
securities" to support Regulation S-K).
488. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
489. Id.
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The shareholder's theory of reliance is popularly known as the
"fraud-on-the-market theory., 490 Justice Blackmun explained that the
fraud-on-the-market theory was based on a theory that "in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is
determined by the available material information."49' However, Justice
Blackmun cautioned that the Court's task was not to assess the theory's
validity, but to determine whether the lower court could apply a
rebuttable presumption of reliance.492 The Court concluded that it was
appropriate to consider other alternatives of reliance in securities
litigation because transactions typically occurred though the
mechanisms of large, impersonal trading markets.493
The Court reasoned that a market operates as an intermediary
between buyer and seller thereby relaying information to the investor in
the form of a market price.494 The market thus, performs a valuation
process similar to processes transpiring in face-to-face transactions.495
The market acts as an unpaid agent, relaying to the investor that based
on all the information available to it, the value of the stock is the market
price. 496 The court also noted various empirical studies and law review
articles extolling the virtues of ECMH.49 7
In sum, Basic affirms that a plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reliance when he demonstrates that a fraudulent
statement, omission or non-disclosure relating to a security traded in an
"efficient" market: no personal reliance necessary.498 Moreover, since
the 1970's, the majority of corporate and securities law studies have
used the ECMH as the basis to advocate their policies.499
490. Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485
U.S. 224 (1988).
491. Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42.
492. See id.
493. See id.
494. Id. at 244.
495. See id.
496. See id.
497. See id. at 247.
498. See id. ("[M]aterially misleading misstatements [must] have been disseminated
into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities.").
499. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028 (1982) (arguing that, consistent with ECMH,
management should be allowed to facilitate competing tender offers); John H. Langbein
& Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Reg. FD Diminishes Analysts'Roles to the Detriment of Efficient
Markets
For markets to be efficient, information about a company must be
incorporated quickly and with great precision.5°° Eugene Fama stated
that well-informed and intelligent investors in an active market would
fairly value securities reflecting all available public knowledge.5 0' The
"well-informed" and "intelligent" investors Fama is referring to are
market professionals such as financial analysts. Analysts perform two
roles that lead to the formation of efficient markets: they produce and
price information.502 "Production of information" involves searching for
unknown information affecting prices."3 Such information includes
information about the particular issuer as well as general market
information .5 04 "Pricing of information" requires analysts to analyze the
value of information which may lead to trading based on discrepancies
between value and price.05 Analysts can use their information to either
trade for their clients or give recommendations and advice to others.0 6
When analysts use their information in the form of recommendations or
other reports, they contribute to an information market.0 7  The
information market contains important benefits which improves the
efficiency of the capital market.508 For example, every analyst who
RES. J. 1 (arguing that because of ECMH, index funds are prudent investments); Daniel
R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978) (arguing tender offer
regulation was inappropriate despite teachings of ECMH).
500. See Gilson & Kraakrnan, supra note 462, at 574-79 (discussing the
mechanisms by which information is disclosed).
501. See Investor Home, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Random Walk
Theory, supra note 464.
502. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and





507. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 502, at 1263.
508. Id.
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discloses her research can be used as a foundation for research by other
analysts, which assists them in improving their pricing.5°9 In addition,
the information market leads to greater participation in the capital
market. When analysts' reports are read by retail investors, they become
more aware of financial events, which helps them build trust and
confidence in the market.10 Confident investors are more likely to place
trades, which leads to the demand of use of other analyst reports in the
future and thus, lowers the cost of capital for firms.5 '
The vague standard of materiality under Reg. FD makes it difficult
for issuers to determine with certainty what constitutes immaterial
disclosure. 12 As a result, issuers tend to err on the side of caution by not
providing earnings guidance or not speaking to analysts. 1 3 The rule
greatly hinders an analyst's ability to "ferret out" immaterial information
from an issuer or question the integrity of the information provided.
Because analysts are unable to ask questions and seek explanations, they
are unable to "complete the mosaic," and thus, hinder their production of
information function which is necessary for efficient markets.
Analysts' ability to "ferret out and analyze information" has been
recognized by the Supreme Court. 1 4 In Dirks, the Court found this
function was "necessary to the presentation of a healthy market.' 515 The
SEC itself has recognized the invaluable services of analysts. In the
same case, the SEC in its brief stated, "[the] value to the entire market of
[analysts'] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is
significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze
information, and thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all
investors."'
1 6
Analysts ferret out information that, to the average investor, may
seem inconsequential, but when supplemented with other information
becomes highly informative and useful for investment decision-making.
This process has been likened to putting together a jigsaw puzzle whose
final picture is unknown but whose outline appears as new pieces are
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Seeid. at 1264.
512. See, e.g., Arthur Zeikel letter, supra note 56.
513. See, e.g., Hann's Statement, supra note 414.
514. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
515. Id.
516. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 n. 17.
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assembled. 1 7 Because of analysts' experience, intuition, and education
they are able "to see" the whole picture before less perceptive
individuals including unsophisticated investors. The "production of
information" tasks analysts perform include spotting and comparing
inconsistent or contradictory public information with their own
information they have gathered through observation and study. Analysts
work like police detectives and are able to uncover clues about their
target, i.e., company, which may lead to a more thorough investigation.
Because analysts can "see the big picture" as a result of their
investigations before other individuals, their research reports are an
important source of information for investors. Analysts fulfill their
"pricing of information" role by valuing the information they uncovered
through their investigations and making necessary buy or sell
recommendations. All market participants including other investment
professionals such as "buy-side" analysts 8,  institutional and
professional traders, and retail investors benefit by using analysts'
research and supplementing with their own experience and study to
make better investment decisions.
Professor Daniel R. Fischel states that analysts also perform a
monitoring function by checking the information provided by issuers
whose management may disseminate false information or attempt to
conceal negative information.1 9 In addition, analysts enable companies
to disseminate information more cheaply as compared to public
disclosure.5120  Fischel notes that because analysts have a distinct
advantage over lay investors in seeking and interpreting information,
investors will utilize their recommendations to avoid needless
expense.52 ' Most importantly, Fischel advocates that analysts and
517. See, e.g., Arthur Zeikel letter, supra note 56.
518. Buy-side analysts are "[a]n analyst employed by an entity, such as a mutual
fund, that invests on its own accounts." Investorwords.com, at
http://www.investorwords.com/cgi-bin/getword.cgi?656 (last visited Mar. 27, 2004)
(noting buy-side analysts often purchase research from sell-side analysts for buy-side
analysts' own use).
519. Daniel R. Fischel, Symposium on Insider Trading: Insider Trading and
Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. SEC, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127,
141-43 (1984) (discussing how the dissemination of information to investment analysts




professional investors produce superior risk-adjusted portfolio returns
for their clients. At first this may seem contrary to the ECMH which
states that markets are so efficient that investors cannot earn superior
returns. Fischel explains the paradox by noting studies that show that
some information is not reflected in stock prices to ensure informed
traders earn a competitive return for their diligence. 22 Analysts usually
follow a "top down" approach to analyzing particular companies.
Analysts must be knowledgeable not only about their target company
but also the environment in which they operate. First, analysts must be
aware of the global economy and the intricate interdependence of
economies of various nation-states. Second, analysts then examine the
sector and industry of their target company. Only then do analysts
examine the individual target company including its strategy,
management, finances, and operating history. Analysts then use the
information they have gathered to produce complex earnings forecasting
models to value a company's stock. This estimated value is then
compared to the stock's trading value and an appropriate buy/hold/sell
decision is made. It is important to note that an analyst's model is only
as good as the data and inputs that he receives.5 23 Good analysts do not
try to find data that fit their model; good analysts develop a model that
represents the data. And it is no wonder why analysts spend so much
time and energy trying to find all available information.
Occasionally, the analyst as detective must question the company's
management. With a skeptic's eye, an analyst asks penetrating
questions that tests management's belief in its story. These
conversations increase the amount of information available to the
markets and supplement existing public information. Analysts need
these conversations "because through these discussions analysts gain
insight into a company's activities, ambiguity and uncertainty is
reduced, and more understandable and relevant information will reach
the market. '5 24 In addition, analysts need one-on-one discussions "in
order to fully understand the company's background and culture, to gain
perspective about trends and developments. 525
522. Id. (citing S.J. Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets
Where Trades Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 73 (1976)); S.J. Grossman & J.E.





700 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
Critics argue that it is impossible for analyst to speak with
management without it disclosing material information. Nothing can be
further from the truth. Reg. FD does not disallow one-on-one
communications between an issuer and an analyst but only mandates
public disclosure if material, nonpublic information is disclosed. If the
SEC was convinced that issuers would always disclose material
nonpublic information, it would disallow the communications altogether
or promulgate heavier sanctions for such activities. One commentator
shared his frustrations about convincing critics that private disclosure of
non-material information is possible. Louis Thompson, President of the
National Investor Relations Institute, notes that many of the SEC
attorneys who draft the securities laws have no real world experience
from the time they graduate from law school. 26 Thompson expressed
frustration where he brought several investment relation officers in front
of SEC staffers to discuss how company officials could engage in one-
on-one conversations with analysts without disclosing material,
nonpublic information. 27 Thompson lamented that after reading the
staffers' body language, he knew they just did not "get it. 5 28
Thomson's fears were realized when the SEC in its Adopting Release
stated one-on-ones would be under heightened scrutiny for materiality
determinations.
29
Some critics argue that analysts can receive all the information they
need without talking to management. This is incorrect. Allow me to
demonstrate with a short story that may be known to some readers.5 30 A
professor assigned a research project to his students, and he asked them
to write about all they could learn about fish. Later, the students
finished their reports and were eager to discuss their findings with the
professor. One student boasted that he spent many hours in a library
perusing research periodicals about fish. Another student countered by
exclaiming that he rented several videotapes about fish. A third student
526. Louis M. Thompson, Jr., The New World of Corporate Disclosure: Reg. FD,
Sarbanes-Oxley and Beyond, Keynote address before the DeMarche Manager Institute
Conference, Feb. 20, 2003, available at http://www.
Niri.org/newsmedia-center/speeches/03022ONaplesDeMarcheSprConf.pdf (last




530. The author does not recall the book or the author of the story.
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exulted that he spoke with his uncle who researched fish. The professor
sadly shook his head. He was sorely disappointed. He told his young
students that if they wanted to learn all about fish, they must examine
fish first hand. He told them that no research compares to actual
experience.
The same can be said about analysts. Analysts can read all about a
particular company until they are sick to their stomachs. Analysts can
also watch all the public television announcements as well. But analysts
may not truly know what all this information means until they had a
chance to put it all in perspective by talking to a corporate executive and
experiencing first hand what the company has to say. This experience is
similar to Professor Sean McGuire's admonition to genius Will Hunting
in the movie, "Good Will Hunting", where McGuire rebukes Hunting
where when asked about love Hunting may be able to recite
Shakespearean sonnets, but he would never know love until he "looked
at a woman and became totally vulnerable."53' So, too, analysts may
"know" much about a company but will not get the whole experience
unless they converse with management.
There is much more information that is discussed in one-on-one
meetings besides earnings. Topics sometimes include strategy, company
history, corporate mission and goals, management's philosophy, and
competitive advantages and disadvantages.532 One survey found that
four of the top seven drivers of stock value are non-financial.533 Another
survey discovered that institutional investors place great importance on
non-financial measures and intangible assets.534 The materiality of non-
financial measures such as human capital and employee loyalty is
531. This quote is taken from the 1997 movie, Good Will Hunting.
532. Louis M. Thompson, Jr., Guidance for Compliance With Regulation FD,
Executive Alert, Sep. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.niri.org/publications/alerts/EA09 1001 .cfm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
533. Id.
The most recent NIRI trends survey shows that four out of the top seven factors that
IROs say drive share value are non-financial. Quality of management and strategy
execution were rated slightly higher than earnings growth and cash flow respectively.
The company's long-term strategy and specific industry conditions were rated about
the same as sales/revenue growth.
534. Id. ("Studies by Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers demonstrate that
the institutional investors place significant importance on non-financial measures and
intangible assets.").
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arguably less than earnings guidance; therefore, there are subject matters
that management should be able to discuss with analysts.
Private contacts between companies and analysts contribute to
marketplace efficiency. Corporate executives may be more willing to
disclose information if they do so privately, rather than publicly.
Management may talk more candidly because they are dealing with
sophisticated experts who are comfortable with talking about hyper-
technical and esoteric information. Analysts use these data inputs in
their models the results of which are published through analysts' reports.
The market benefits from the use of this new information. I accept the
notion that there are great disparities in business savviness between lay
and professional investors. Some stock market players hit home runs,
while others, such as myself, watch from the stands. 5 In fact, many
investors recognize the utility of stock market giants as evidenced by the
number of investors and amount of money parked in mutual funds.536 At
the end of 2001, more than 93 million people invested six point nine
trillion dollars into mutual funds.537 This dollar amount shows that
investors recognize the value of investment professionals such as
portfolio managers and analysts.
In sum, the market as a whole is damaged when issuers fail to
communicate one-on-one with analysts. If issuers decide to disseminate
information to the public at once, thus bypassing analysts, markets react
inefficiently. Untrained, inexperienced investors do not have the
requisite skill, experience, or knowledge to assess information
accurately as provided to them. The purchasing and selling of stocks by
irrational investors leads to a failure of the ECMH, as the stock price no
longer reflects the value of all available information. Rather, the stock
price reflects the value determined by irrational investors.
535. At first glance this statement may run counter to the notion that under efficient
markets superior returns are highly unlikely. The author notes that ECMH assumes
many intelligent market participants. However, not all market participants are equally
intelligent. The author believes that in a very large market with many participants,
there exist some individuals who possess an uncanny ability to assess the worth of
particular information (pricing of information function) and allows them to make more
informed investment decisions.
536. See Cheryl Marconi, Why Choose A Mutual Fund Over Individual Securities?,
401 K.com, available at http://www.401k.com/401k/new/Mfis.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2004) (citing Mutual Fund Fact Book, Investment Company Institute 2002).
537. Id.
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B. Selective Disclosure Leads to More Efficient Markets.
The SEC and many proponents of Reg. FD argue that one-on-one
meetings between issuers and analysts resulted in nothing more than
selective disclosure that inures to the benefit of the analysts' clients or
employer. In other words, Reg. FD advocates contend issuers provide
analysts with inside information in return for analysts furnishing
favorable reports. The author notes that little empirical evidence exists
to establish that this alleged practice was the rule rather than the
exception. In fact, the SEC conducted no factual study on the alleged
pervasiveness of selective disclosure and only cited anecdotal evidence
of selective disclosure in its final rule release."'
Even assuming, arguendo, that selective disclosure occurred in
meetings between companies and analysts through a wink or nod or
overt and intentional declarations, selective disclosure is not necessarily
a bad thing. Allowing analysts to derive private benefit from inside
information ensures that the new information will reach the market
rapidly in which share prices adjust quickly to reflect the new
information, thus leading to efficient markets. When analysts have more
data inputs, albeit nonpublic, material information, their economic
models will more accurately reflect the intrinsic value of a company's
shares. Based on the differences between stock intrinsic value and stock
market price, investor trading will take place and lead to a more accurate
stock price. When share prices more accurately reflect available
knowledge about companies, economic efficiency is enhanced.
Selective disclosure is not insider trading. Although the SEC
believes that both insider trading and selective disclosure harm the
integrity of the market because market participants lose confidence in a
market dominated by insiders with superior information, 5 9 the SEC fails
to account for the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks. There, the Court
found illegal only use of selectively disclosed information for personal
advantage.540 This distinction is important because the Court recognized
that selectively disclosed information that is not used for one's personal
benefit is "necessary to the presentation of a healthy market. 54'
538. See General Rule, supra note 13.
539. Id., at 51,716.
540. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
541. Id. at 658.
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Selective disclosure and insider trading are different violations
under the Exchange Act of 1934. Insider trading is a violation of
Section 10b and Rule lOb-5 thereunder (anti-fraud provision), whereas
selective disclosure is a violation of Reg. FD.142 Selectively disclosed
information is used for analysts' research and production of information
function whereas insider trading's purpose is for "manipulation or
deception"5 43 for personal gain. 44  Analysts simply cannot be liable
under Rule lOb-5 unless the information they disseminated was used to
willfully defraud. 45
Despite the distinctions enumerated above, the SEC and other Reg.
FD proponents' position is to treat selective disclosure and insider
trading similarly. For example, the SEC in its Reg. FD final release
stated "a close resemblance" between selective disclosure and insider
trading existed. 46 The. SEC also delineated similar adverse impacts on
market integrity and economic effects.547  In addition, an often
overlooked fact in the release is where the SEC took the opportunity,
sua sponte, to change existing insider trading laws by modifying Rule
10b5-1148 and Rule 10b5-2.5 49 For purposes of argument, I assumed that
542. Id. at 651,716.
543. Id. at 663.
544. Id.
545. See at 667 n. 27.
546. See Insider Trading, supra note 196. ("Issuer selective disclosure bears a close
resemblance in this regard to ordinary 'tipping' and insider trading. In both cases, a
privileged few gain an informational edge-and the ability to use that edge to profit-
from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or
diligence.").
547. Id.
Likewise, selective disclosure has an adverse impact on market integrity that is similar
to the adverse impact from illegal insider trading: investors lose confidence in the
fairness of the markets when they know that other participants may exploit
'unerodable informational advantages' derived not from hard work or insight, but
from their access to corporate insiders. The economic effects of the two practices are
essentially the same.
548. Id. at 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2004). The rule now defines "on the basis of' to mean
awareness of material nonpublic information. A trade is on the basis of material
nonpublic information if the trader was aware of the material, nonpublic information
when the person made the purchase or sale. The SEC stated the awareness standard
reflects the common sense notion that a trader who is aware of inside information when
making a decision inevitably makes use of the information.
549. Id. at 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2004). The rule now sets forth a non-exclusive list of
three situations in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the
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the two actions are similar but prove that selective disclosures of
material, inside information will lead to more efficient capital markets
because share prices will reflect all information: both public and private.
Presumably, inside information will be disclosed publicly at some time
in the future. If this was not the case, insiders would have no incentive
to trade on inside information. Insiders with nonpublic information will
bid up or down the prices of stocks in anticipation of the public release
of information. The result is the stock price will more fully reflect all
information about a company at any point in time.
C. Small Firms Receive Analyst Coverage by Lowering Analysts' Cost
of Production of Information
We have already discussed how analysts are important for many
companies, especially small ones, whose existence is not well-known to
the market. For a variety of reasons, many companies do not attract
analysts' attention. For lesser known companies, the costs to some
analysts to fulfill their production of information role are substantially
higher than any return they may realize to justify their coverage. The
problem is magnified if the analyst is the first to initiate coverage
because of the huge resources expended to begin research. Costs are
lower for other analysts to follow because they can "piggy back" on the
research conducted by the first analyst. Because few analysts are willing
to expend the money and take the risk of initiating coverage of a
company, the capital market is hurt where investors are
unknowledgeable about another possible investment opportunity.
Likewise, the company is hurt because its shares are infrequently traded
"misappropriation" theory of the Exchange Act and Rule 1 Ob-5 thereunder. A duty of
trust or confidence exists: (1) whenever a person agrees to maintain information in
confidence; (2) when two people have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing
confidences such that the recipient knows or reasonably should know that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will
maintain its confidentiality, (3) when a person receives or obtains material nonpublic
information from certain enumerated family members: spouses, parents, children, and
siblings. Id. The rule was expected to address the anomalous result under case law
where a family member who trades in breach of a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality does not violate Rule lOb-5 but would violate that rule if the family
member received a tip and then traded or traded in breach of an express promise of
confidentiality. Id.
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which leads do decreased liquidity. Efficiency in markets with smaller
companies is decreased.
Small companies can rectify this situation by enticing analysts to
follow the companies' stock by offering selective disclosures. Analysts
who receive this information will save money by not expending as much
resources on research. This lowers the costs to analysts which makes
coverage of small companies more likely. The analysts may also benefit
by receiving a higher than competitive rate of return on their
investments through selective disclosure and subsequent trading by its
firm. The higher returns compensate the analyst for the increased risk
she assumes from initiating coverage. In addition, the analyst receives
sensitive information in which she uses to update her earnings models
and issues reports which are read by market participants. New
information travels in the market and is reflected in more accurate share
prices of the target company. Efficiency in the markets with smaller
companies is thus increased.550
D. Other Critics on Ban on Insider Trading and Selective Disclosure
Some critics on the ban on insider trading suggest that shareholders
and managers should be permitted to contract over the allocation of
property rights in inside information.5"' These critics posit that privately
negotiated agreements will allocate resources to their most valuable
use.552  Professors Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel argue that
insider trading is a good form of compensation.553 For example, they
declare that when a manager sees a good investment for the firm such as
a possible merger, the manager will be more inclined to pursue the
merger if she is rewarded on success. 54 Professor Jonathan Macey
550. Professors Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky agree. They state: "Yet,
for small companies whose shares are traded with low liquidity, it is a necessary step on
the way to competitive analyst coverage. In this sense, the exclusivity generated by
selective disclosure is analogous to that created by patent or copyright protection."
Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 502, at 1269.
551. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading,
35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861-66 (1983).
552. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. 1, 10 (1960).
553. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 254-55 (1991).
554. Id.
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articulates that allowing insider trading will enable corporate managers
to reduce their salary demands equal to the expected gain from insider
trading.555 Shareholders benefit by paying lower salaries to managers." 6
Professor Henry Manne declares that allowing managers to trade on
inside information creates incentives to produce valuable information
that inures to the benefit of shareholders by increasing the value of the
firm.5
57
E. Insider Trading Properly Motivates Management
I agree with Professors Easterbrook and Fischel who argue that
insider trading adequately compensates managers and motivates them to
work in the interest of the company and its shareholders. For insider
trading to be profitable, stock prices must move. Management will do
everything in its power to seek profitable projects, lower costs, and so on
to increase share price. If management is successful, they are rewarded
and the firm's shareholders benefit from a higher share price.
Of course one can argue that management can engage in nefarious
practices that would lead to a stock price decline. Managers who short
sale their stock would benefit to the detriment of long shareholders.
Companies can easily remedy this possibility by contracting with
managers to disallow short sales. Moreover, the likelihood of this
scenario occurring is poor. Managers do not work in isolation and are
accountable to higher ups. In addition, managers often direct the work
of people below them. The people with whom the managers interact are
likely to spot and report any suspicious activity to the responsible
parties. Unless a conspiracy is involved,55 8 managers cannot get away
with corporate sabotage.
Increased share price accuracy due to selective disclosure will limit
the extent to which managers place their own interests above the
corporation. For example, the threat of hostile takeovers increases when
555. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND
POLICY 3 (1991).
556. Id.
557. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 101,
102 (1966).
558. Even with the highly publicized fallouts of corporate executives at Enron,
Tyco, and Adelphia, corporate conspiracies of these magnitudes happen relatively
infrequently.
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managers engage in actions that do not maximize shareholder value. The
threat of takeovers increases because takeovers are less risky for
potential acquirers and target companies have a lesser chance of
deterring a takeover with an inaccurately high share price.5" 9  In
addition, Professor Merritt Fox posits that when risks associated with
holding an issuer's stock in a non-diversified portfolio is lessened, the
use of share price based management compensations is increased
because of increased share price accuracy, which aligns the interests of
management and shareholders.' 60
F. Selective Disclosure Is Fair: Outsiders Are Neither Hurt nor Helped
by Insider Trading
The SEC has consistently disparaged the use of selective disclosure
and insider trading. The SEC believes that the practices harm the
integrity of the market because the investing public loses confidence in a
market when they perceive the market is controlled by investors who
have access to superior information. In other words, selective disclosure
leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity and fairness of
capital markets.
I note that economics is concerned with efficiency and not fairness.
Fairness is a policy matter better left for discussion among politicians
and philosophers. However, because the SEC cited fairness as one of its
reasons for justifying the need for Reg. FD5 61, a proper discussion is not
irrelevant. I will attempt to prove that although selective disclosure may
lead to a transfer of wealth, this practice is not unfair.
Allow me to propose an overly simplistic hypothetical. Suppose a
stock sells for $10 but an analyst believes the stock will soon trade
upwards to $15. If the analyst's clients purchase the stock based on
selectively disclosed information received by the analyst, the stock price
will move towards $15. Presumably, the stock price will reach $15
sooner than it otherwise would have. Because the stock price
approaches $15 (and all prices between $10 and $15) sooner than it
would have, insider trading makes the market more efficient because the
559. Merrit B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should
Regulate Whom, 95 MWCH. L. REV. 2498, 2547-49 (1997) (discussing value of
accurate share pricing).
560. Id. at 2458-50.
561. See Selective Disclosure, supra note 39.
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$15 price reflects all available information including nonpublic
information.
Some critics of selective disclosure and insider trading argue that
because a company has a fixed number of outstanding shares, for each
share purchased by one of the analyst's clients on the basis of the
analyst's advice (due to the selective disclosure) leaves one less share
held by an outsider who did not receive the analyst's advice. In the long
run, the analyst's clients' gains would equal the losses to the outsiders.
Clients benefit at the expense of outsiders. This transfer of wealth is
seen as unfair to critics of insider trading despite any increases in market
efficiencies.
Critics' fairness argument is unpersuasive because they are
focusing on the wrong period of time. The appropriate period of time to
analyze fairness should be at the outset when investors decide whether
or not to buy the stock. At the outset, investors decide whether the risks
in the stock justify the market price. If not, investors forego the
purchase. One of the hundreds of risks affecting market price and return
is insider trading and selective disclosure. Insider trading occurs in U.S.
capital markets.562 If the buyer bets that the current market price
adequately reflects the risk of insider trading (i.e., bought at a discount)
and selective disclosure subsequently occurs to her detriment, she cannot
complain. At the outset, the buyer took a chance that insider trading
would occur, and she paid a lower price on the stock to reflect that risk.
In effect, she lost her wager. Critics may argue the investor was
unaware of the risk of insider trading. This may be true but the investor
is probably unaware of other risks as well such as currency rate
exchange, interest rates, production bottlenecks, etc. If the investor
accepts the rewards of a stock gain, she must accept all the underlying
risks, known and unknown.
Lay investors trade stocks for a variety of reasons. Some choose
particular stocks based on fundamentals, others choose based on whim.
562. The following are just reported cases of insider trading. See, e.g., Former
ImClone CEO Samuel Waksal to Pay More Than $800,000 in SEC Insider Trading
Case, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-30.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2004); S.E.C. v. James Murphy, Robert Lockwood, and Gilboa Perez, Lit. Release No.
16725, (Sep. 26, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigationlitreleasesflrl6725.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2004);
S.E.C. v. Samir Traboulsi, Lit. Release No. 15429, (Aug. 4, 1997), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigationlitreleases/lrl5429.txt (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
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Many investors purchase stocks for retirement and savings purposes and
sell stocks to meet future expenses or emergencies. These investors
maintain a buy-and-hold strategy and hold stocks for the long-term.
Hence, these investors do not try to "beat the market" by trading
frequently. Suppose selective disclosure and concomitant trading by an
analyst's clients occurs which "bids up" the price of a particular stock.
Suppose further the buy-and-hold investor purchases this artificially
inflated stock. Arguably, this investor has "lost" money because she
purchased a stock at a higher price than would have been purchased had
the selective disclosure and trading not occurred. Suppose however, that
it becomes time for the investor to sell. Because the stock price is
artificially higher than it would be absent insider trading, the investor
has "gained" money due to the selective disclosure. Because the
investors loses and gains more with the presence of selective disclosure,
the net effect is that selective disclosure cancels both the gains and
losses to the investor. In sum, over the investors' lifetimes, they break
even.
In another example, suppose an investor is willing to pay the
current market price, $10, for a stock. Suppose further that an "insider,"
such as an analyst, has knowledge of an impending, negative news
announcement. At the same time, the insider short sells the stock. If the
announcement is made, the stock price falls to $5. The buyer loses $5
while the short seller gains $5. In this example, the insider is not the
cause of the buyer's loss because the buyer decided to purchase the
stock at the outset. In fact, the insider can argue that his short selling
resulted in a lower purchase price for the buyer such that the buyer can
"average down" his loss. The buyer may counter by arguing that
insiders have an incentive to delay disclosing their inside information so
as to maximize their profit potential from the market's ignorance to the
detriment of outsiders. I believe the analyst can successfully rebut this
argument by explaining that analysts and other insiders are in
competition with themselves, and if one analyst waits too long to trade,
another analyst may trade before her. Thus, the information is divulged
to the market and the second analyst loses her superior information
advantage. To conclude, analysts will be motivated to disclose their
information as quickly as possible so as to not lose their trading
opportunity to other insiders. Analysts with selectively disclosed
information, driven by their self-interest and competition by other
analysts will hurry to be the first to trade until the "correct" stock price
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is reached. I realize that some smaller companies may have only one
analyst covering them where the analyst holds a monopoly on the inside
information. If this is so, outsiders have a valid reason to argue.
However, for small companies this exclusivity may be a necessary step
on the way to wider analyst coverage.
Investors are able to protect themselves from the perceived risks of
insider trading. Insider trading is a company specific risk that can be
diversified away by carrying a large basket of stocks. 63 Critics may
argue that not all investors are able to afford purchasing several stocks to
establish a diversified portfolio. Although this is true, investors are able
to purchase mutual funds which give investors instant diversification."
Some mutual funds can be purchased for as little as $500565 which is a
relatively small enough dollar amount to attract investors.
Selective disclosure may appear unfair especially to outsiders who
must compete with insiders. Portfolio managers of active funds (and lay
investors) may find it increasingly difficult to make above average
returns in markets made more efficient by selective disclosure and
concomitant trading by analysts. However, this in itself does not imply
selective disclosure is malicious. Although portfolio managers and other
outsiders may arguably be harmed, their interests are incongruent with
the interests of the market and the economy. The economy as a whole
gains by more efficient pricing of stocks. Even if outsiders might suffer
harm, the beneficial effects to the market and economy greatly outweigh
the harm to a select few. Critics may argue that investors will not invest
in a market they deem is unfair which, in the aggregate, would harm the
entire market. I agree that many investors may decide to keep their
money stashed under their bed mattresses. But despite the numerous
news articles about insider trading in the United States, 66 there is no
563. Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTs 350 (5th ed. 2002) (stating firm specific risk
can be eliminated through diversification).
564. Why Mutual Funds?, at
http://www.kiplinger.com/basics/archives/2003/03/fundsl.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
565. Id.
566. See, e.g., Catherine Valenti, With Insider Trading, the Key is Who Knew What
and How They Knew It, ABCNEWS.COM (June 24, 2003), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/DailyNews/insidertradingO20624.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2004) (providing basic overview of insider trading and landmark
cases).
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evidence that insider trading has discouraged a significant number of
investors from participating in the stock market.
If selective disclosure is allowed, not only will capital markets
become more efficient, but there may no longer be a need for SEC's
oversight of mandatory disclosures. The SEC since time immemorial
has advocated the need for disclosure and transparency. Former SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt has championed increased disclosure since his
tenure began in 1993.567 Levitt established a free SEC website568 that
features corporate filings and other valuable information as well as Reg.
FD which is the subject of this Article. If selective disclosure is
allowed, there will be no delays or uncertainties about what has to be
disclosed. There will be no issues about when and in what form
information must be disclosed. Companies, through the trading of its
analysts, will effectively disclose to the market information which will
be reflected in increased share price accuracy. Investors will receive
important information in the form of accurate share pricing. There may
no longer be a need to regulate broker-dealers, investment advisers,
analysts, etc. New information will be evaluated efficiently through a
market-driven process without the excessive entanglement of
government.
CONCLUSION
Regulation FD represents a noble attempt by the SEC to restore a
balance of power between lay investors and professionals such as
investment analysts. Although the SEC attempted to alleviate a problem
perceived as unjust, the problem was more apparent than real. The SEC
only cited news articles as evidence of this alleged ubiquitous practice.
The SEC, without the benefit of a proper cost-benefit analysis, has
created new law whose over-inclusiveness has burdened the great
majority of public companies who are good corporate citizens. Despite
former Commissioner Unger's and the industry's concerns about Reg.
FD including the chilling of corporate disclosures, lack of better
567. F.T. McCarthy, Shining Light on the Markets: Arthur Levitt's Chairmanship of
the Securities Exchange Commission May Be Ending with a Fight over One of the Most
Fundamental Issues in American Capitalism: Who Should Be in the Know,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 2000, at 71 (stating increased disclosure was Levitt's highest
priority).
568. See http://www.sec.gov.
REGULATION FD-FAIRL Y DISRUPTIVE?
materiality standards, and others, the SEC made only modest revisions
to Reg. FD more likely to appease rather than to quell their fears. The
three SEC enforcement actions against Secure, Raytheon, and Siebel
highlighted the SEC's unwillingness to further provide guidance on
materiality and instead relied on after-the-fact evidence of materiality
such as stock volume and price changes. Reg. FD has only contributed
to the confusion among issuers as to how to comply with the rule and
avoid enforcement actions. Instead of providing clear guidance on what
actions are prohibited, the regulation has increased uncertainty in an
already uncertain marketplace.
The push for increased disclosure is not having the effect the
envisioned by the Commission. Although there is some evidence that
the number of corporate disclosures has not been "chilled," these studies
only analyzed earnings forecasts and not other forms of disclosures such
as webcasts, one-on-one telephonic meetings with analysts, Form 8-K's,
and others. In addition, these studies have not analyzed the quality of
information which many analysts and market professionals argue have
been diminished. Other studies proved Reg. FD's opponents' criticisms
were justified. Stock volatility has increased after Reg. FD and the
accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts has declined dramatically. The
SEC should re-evaluate Reg. FD in light of these recent findings.
Although Reg. FD may have "leveled the playing field" to the
delight of lay investors, the SEC has done so at great costs. Private
contacts between issuers and investors lead to more efficient markets
which redounds to the benefit of all investors through the efficient
allocation of economic resources. If Reg. FD curtails the use of
selective disclosure, but in so doing makes all investors less
knowledgeable about the company, it will not create fairer, more
efficient markets. Reg. FD has brought inefficiency to the market by
dissuading issuers from communicating one-on-one with analysts; in its
place, issuers are disclosing information to the public at once.
Untrained, inexperienced investors do not have the requisite experience,
skill, or knowledge to assess this information accurately when
formulating investment decisions leading to a failure of efficient capital
markets. Instead of stock prices reflecting the informed buying and
selling by rational investors, the prices reflect market actions by
irrational investors as they work feverishly to decipher corporate
disclosures.
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Even if selective disclosure occurred frequently in the market, this
practice leads to more efficient markets. When analysts receive new
information from companies and trading by analysts' clients occurs, this
new information will reach the market in the form of updated share
prices which adjusted quickly to reflect the new information, thus
leading to efficient markets. Stock prices more accurately reflect their
intrinsic value if trading occurs with the knowledge of both public and
private information. Market efficiency is not the only benefit of
selective disclosure. Small, lesser known companies can attract analyst
coverage of their stock by offering selective disclosures. The trading
profits from selective disclosures will help offset the increased risk the
analyst assumes from initiating coverage.
Despite the SEC's and lay investors' criticisms, selective disclosure
is fair. When an investor chooses whether to purchase a particular stock,
she must decide whether the current market price is greater than the risks
reflected in that stock. One of several risks inherent in stock markets is
selective disclosure. This risk is "priced in" and appropriately
discounted in the current market price. If the investor purchases this
stock whose price in the future ultimately falls because of selective
disclosure, the investor cannot complain because she bought the stock at
a discount and thus, lost her wager. Further, if the stock price went up
because of selective disclosure, the investor gained through no action of
her own. In the long run, the investor's net position is offset by these
two possible alternatives.
Reg. FD's effect may be more symbolic than real. The SEC
responded to a practice perceived by the public to be unfair and unjust.
The SEC, in haste, promulgated new regulatory obligations on issuers
without contemplating the costs and burdens associated with such a rule.
In the end, the SEC made a policy decision and weighed fairness over
efficiency. Investors have received little benefits from the regulation
and many more disadvantages. The SEC has fairly disrupted a system
by entangling itself in a market which has, for many years, shown that
its industry professionals know best how to operate.
